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Regy		2/12	C.W.L. (468)		23/12			
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1970



25 OCT 1970

# Now Jordan's top brass feels top dog

from GAVIN YOUNG: Amman, 24 October

THROUGH sporadic shot and shell, Jordanians are trying still to cement their cease-fire agreement with the Palestinian commandos.

But the agreement by which the Army probably hopes to isolate and surround the commandos in known bases in the Jordanian countryside is not nearly as favourable to the Palestinians as people have been saying recently. An atmosphere of mutual bitterness now reaches down into the village street. The future of the Palestinian guerrilla movement hangs in the balance.

Small things have a larger significance. Jordanian soldiers shot up the house of Yasser Arafat, leader of Al Fatah, this week and in the mêlée an Army officer and a small girl were killed. A mixed bunch of Arab officers of the Arab committee observer mission were stoned out of the southern city of Kerak, when they tried to set up an office there, by conservative Jordanian peasants and farmers. A Jordanian Army shell, out of the blue, demolished a rest house at Ramtha, on the Syrian border, killing the Al Fatah representative and missing a Saudi officer of the observer commission by a bee's whisker.

The Jordanian top brass now feels top dog. But it is not a simple situation. Probing through the haze of mistrust, one sees that in north Jordan the Jordanian Army is toughly pressing on with the implementation of the cease-fire agreement signed by King Hussein and Arafat last week. It is keeping only just within the bounds of the spirit of the agreement, if that, and some of the rank and file of both the Army and the commandos are barely under control of their officers. In Amman, things are tense, but quiet.

On the Jordan-Syria border you can see in high relief the problem of re-establishing Army-commando coexistence. There the Army has been shelling commandos who have moved to the outskirts of the villages, as the agreement lays down, and the commandos believe the Army wants to cut their legitimate supply routes from Syria. Thus tension is high, increased by the apparently pointless Army shelling of Ramtha.

Tension is many-faced. At a Customs point this week a Jordanian Army sergeant, keyed up to a common but dangerously taut pitch of contempt for any Arabs in civilian clothes coming from Syria, particularly commandos, promptly countermanded an order by an observer commission officer from the Sudan who had waved a commando vehicle through. Pointing his sub-machine gun at the driver, he sent the truck back into Syria.

At the same time, a group of local Jordanian farmers gesticulated and yelled into the faces of Jordanian officers, protesting commando misdeemeanours in their villages. Palestinian commandos countered with insults of their own.

Clearly, if there is to be a resumption of the fighting in

Jordan, it will quite likely turn into a far worse civil war than the last one -- villager against villager, civilian against civilian -- with the killing lines horribly blurred.

Army officers of the Arab observer commission profess guarded optimism. They say they find a genuine good will among commando and Army officers in the area. 'But the hierarchy is blurred,' one of them said. There is a hint of mutiny in the barely concealed passions and the tenuous discipline. Here lies the danger.

In Amman, however, officials persist in playing down these tensions -- understandably since neither King Hussein nor Yasser Arafat wants another round if the agreement can be made to work.

Jordanian official hearts lifted this week when reports circulated that there had been a Government upheaval in Damascus. But all the signs today are that nothing much has happened there for the moment.

The exile of the Iraqi Vice-President, Air Marshal Hardan Takriti, however, does seem to indicate a consolidation of Iraq's civilian leaders and their attendant militancy. Takriti was opposed to an Iraqi intervention in the recent Jordan fighting. As a result, there must certainly be a certain demoralisation in the Iraqi forces in Jordan, so long inactive. A withdrawal, at least to Iraq's frontier, is on the cards.

Meanwhile Amman is not a ruin -- earlier Press talk of a 'Hiroshima' is ludicrous. Nevertheless, UNRWA has come up with a figure of 20,000 for those killed and wounded in the September fighting in Jordan. About 3,000 are civilian dead. The despair of some of the three times homeless refugees led a group in Wahdat camp to surround me crying that they would go anywhere, 'even to Israel,' to escape this violent country. It is the first time I have ever heard such a cry.

A temporary emotional reaction, Yasser Arafat told me this week. But he recognises it.

The commandos are in some disarray, despite a fairly high morale. One of Arafat's top lieutenants estimates that it will take from three to six months to reorganise. They have lost huge stocks of arms. They, too, need to win back lost hearts and minds in the people of the countryside, whose lives have been disrupted and endangered by this futile inter-Arab conflict and who are deeply ashamed of both sides.

King Hussein is, reasonably, trying to play down the tragedy of last month in the interest of future peace. Yet there is a detectable and dangerous near-indifference in some Amman circles to the price paid in human life -- including substantial Army losses.

On both sides, ruthless self-discipline and an end to bombastic one-upmanship and an all too evident strutting, trigger-happiness is needed if real peace is to settle on Jordan.

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REGISTRY NO. 10  
OCT 1970  
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10/11

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Full Text of the Agreement Governing  
Relations between the Revolution and  
the Government

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

We believe that the Jordanian people cling to their unity, are sincere in their cause, reject discord and disunity and disapprove of any manifestation whatsoever of armed confrontation with the forces of the Palestinian revolution.

We are unanimous on the aim of liberating Palestine which demands that all parties concerned should exert all their efforts and stand shoulder to shoulder looking steadfastly towards the stolen homeland beyond the immortal river. It is our conviction that warfare between brothers serves the interests only of the Zionist and imperialist enemy who has ready terrible plans to destroy Jordan as a base of steadfastness and liberation and that therefore anyone who fabricates incidents or works for the continuation of blind civil strife is a member of the enemy and their agents.

In our belief that the cohesion of the armed forces and the forces of the Palestine revolution in the face of the Zionist enemy is the sole guarantee of achieving victory, as happened at Karamah when something of dignity was won back in a brotherhood of arms and a mixing of martyrs' blood in battle ..... and to strengthen the causes of national unity, restoring confidence, healing dissension and dressing wounds in a spirit of national conciliation ..... and in execution of the 8th and 12th articles of the Cairo Agreement, which was signed by the Arab Kings and Presidents on 27.9.1970 and which remains valid in addition to the agreement

/concerning

~~SECRET~~



concerning withdrawal which derived from it, concluded in Amman on 1.10.1970 and attached to this agreement and deemed an annex to it .....

It has been agreed as follows:-

I General Provisions

1. Jordan, with its two Banks, is in its land and people a single indivisible unit and the fundamental base of the Palestine revolution and of the struggle to liberate Palestine.
2. On the basis of paragraph 1 above and to achieve its content, the popular and military energies of Jordan are subordinated to serve the objective of liberating Palestine. The Jordanian Government is committed to support the Palestinian revolution in the battle for liberation, to wrest right from the usurping enemy and to do all in its power to promote solidarity between the Jordan Arab Army and the Palestine Revolution so that, in word and deed, they stand together in one trench against the Zionist enemy to achieve the aim of liberation.
3. Popular and fighting presence, mobilisation and organisation and freedom of political, military, informational, social and financial action and movement are fundamental to the Palestinian Revolution and it shall exercise them freely.
4. The Palestinian people alone, as represented in the Palestinian Revolution, have the right to determine their destiny.
5. The Palestinian Revolution is the struggling national force and a fundamental requirement for the battle against aggression for liberation. Therefore it must be supported and escalated.
6. The Government undertakes that no organ, organisation or agency shall be set up or operate against the interests of the Palestinian Revolution or national unity.

/7. To deepen



7. To deepen popular and national unity by the exercise of complete equality of rights and obligations between all citizens in every walk of life and in all the civil, military, political and economic institutions of the state without any kind of discrimination.

## II Fedayeen Action

1. Amman is considered to be the principal headquarters of the Central Committee of the P.L.O., including all its branches - political, military, information, social etc.
2. The Central Committee shall set up its branch offices in towns and villages of the Kingdom as it sees fit.
3. The Central Committee shall ensure the provision of the necessary guards for its offices in the capital and elsewhere, and also guards for its leadership.
4. The forces of the Palestine Revolution consist of the forces of the P.L.A. and of the bases of the fedayeen. The General Command of the Palestine Revolution appointed by the Central Committee will take over entire responsibility for the forces of the Palestine Revolution.
5. The Central Committee has control over and responsibility for the Palestine Revolution politically, militarily and in everything connected with fedayeen action, activity rights and duties.
6. Whatever obligations the Central Committee undertakes towards the Jordanian Government shall be binding on the Palestine Revolution, all its forces and institutions. Whatever obligations the Government undertakes towards the Central Committee shall be binding on all the organs of the state.
7. Freedom and protection for fedayeen action, and assuring its safety and right to popular and  
/national



national mobilisation are guaranteed by the Jordanian Government, provided that it does not infringe upon the sovereignty of the country within the limits of the law and its observance.

8. The organs of moral mobilisation and information shall be directed to the service of the joint aim of liberation.
9. The following organisations shall be considered principal institutions of the Central Committee and shall perform their work in complete freedom:
  - (a) The Palestinian Red Crescent.
  - (b) The Militia. The General Command of the Palestine Revolution appointed by the Central Committee shall take over responsibility for this organisation and all matters concerning its control and discipline. Members of the militia shall be bound by the regulations in Articles (a), (b) and (c) of Section 2 of Chapter IV.
  - (c) The Youth and Lion Cub (Al-Ashbal) Organisation. The General Command ..... /as for (b) above/.
  - (d) The organisation for caring for the families of fighters and martyrs.
  - (e) "Fatah" newspaper and radio.
  - (f) The medical services of the forces of the Palestine Revolution.
  - (g) The production organisation of the Palestine Revolution.
  - (h) The organisation for scientific study and research.

/III Provisions



III Provisions concerning Fedayeen Bases  
... still secret.

IV Movement

Freedom of movement is guaranteed to the forces of the revolution on all main and subsidiary roads to all HQs, positions and bases of the forces of the revolution, including the road leading into and out of the country. Both sides are forbidden to establish obstacles or barricades on these roads.

Cars of the Palestine Revolution forces, whether armed or not, are permitted to move within towns and villages, but they must have a task order properly signed by the competent authority of the Revolution's Command and are bound by traffic regulations.

Men on leave are permitted to wear uniform while moving about. But such movement must be without arms. Political and military leaders are excepted from this i.e. they can bear personal arms with the written permission of the General Command of the Palestine Revolution.

1. The Jordanian Government is bound to comply with the following:-

(a) No obstruction of individuals of the forces of the Palestine Revolution or interference in their affairs on the part of any authority or under any circumstance except via their Commands.

(b) Authorisation of documents issued by the Central Committee, the military commands and their organs.

/(c) Military



(c) Military and disciplinary offences will be dealt with by the Palestine Revolution Command. Otherwise members of the fedayeen will submit to the Jordanian civil courts.

(d) The Directorate of Public Security will notify the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command of the arrest of any fedayeen for a crime within the jurisdiction of the civil courts.

(e) In crimes which affect the Jordanian armed forces, a joint investigation shall be carried out by the two sides and the accused shall be referred to the competent court.

(f) Members of the forces of the Palestine Revolution will receive the same seemly treatment as is accorded to members of the Jordanian armed forces. Palestine Revolution forces will enjoy the same rights and customary facilities as the Jordanian armed forces.

2. The Central Committee of the P.L.O. is bound to comply with the following:-

(a) No interference with citizens or their possessions in any form by any member of the Palestine Revolution forces.

(b) No obstruction of any member of the Jordanian armed forces by any member of the Palestine Revolution forces.

(c) Compliance with the laws and regulations in force with due regard to the exceptions needed for fedayeen action.

(d) Individuals shall not collect contributions. A unified method of collecting contributions shall be authorised as decreed by the Central Committee.

/((e) Every



(e) Every feda'i committing the crime of assault on the person or property of a citizen shall be handed over to the competent Jordanian courts.

(f) Every feda'i shall carry an identity card with his photograph on the lines of the card authorised in the P.L.A. When he moves, this card will be considered an acceptable travel document on condition that he carries with him a permit or task order from his appropriate authority.

(g) All cars belonging to the Palestine Revolution forces shall be numbered by the appropriate authority in the Central Committee or the General Command of the P.R. forces. Every driver must carry a driving certificate, whether civil, issued by the traffic department, or military, issued by revolution Command. However, uniformity of vehicle markings and their positioning shall be controlled.

(h) No carrying of arms by any member of the Palestine Revolution forces in the towns except in the circumstances earlier prescribed.

(i) No military demonstrations.

(j) No shooting, manoeuvres or training with live ammunition within towns, villages or populated places.

Since Article 5 of the Cairo Agreement requires the immediate release of all detainees, in future the detention or arrest of any person by reason of the recent incidents is forbidden.

/Arising



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8.

Arising from the common desire to implement the Cairo Agreement and this agreement in letter and in spirit and to deal with any case which may arise, a permanent joint committee shall be formed composed of a representative of the Government of the Kingdom of Jordan and a representative of the P.L.O. Central Committee and chaired by the chairman, or his deputy, of the Higher Arab Follow-up Committee, deriving from the meeting of the Arab Kings and Presidents held in September, 1970 in Cairo.

Subordinate to and with the same composition as the permanent joint committee shall be:-

- (1) A permanent political office, charged with all non military matters.
- (2) A permanent military office, charged with all military matters, to which will be attached an executive organ comprised of a number of Arab officers.
- (3) A permanent relief office, charged with all matters concerning the relief of citizens and help for the victims of the recent incidents.

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

(ii) P. letter in 30/10.  
x copy Res. D. x Cabinet Annex  
Staff

(i) Mr. Makins  
to see,  
20/10



BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

422

(1/1)

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
- 21 NOV 1970

23 October, 1970

Dear Christopher,

NES 1/4

Government-Fedayeen Agreement

NET 1/1

Please refer to our telegrams 802 of 14 October and 818 of 20 October. The word "not" was omitted from the first sentence of the former, for which many apologies.

--- 2. I enclose our translation of the full text of the 13 October agreement. The third chapter of the agreement deals with the sites of fedayeen bases and is still secret. Ibrahim Bakr at his press conference stated that the bases would not be situated in towns. The Dutch Chargé has told us (on what authority we do not know) that the fedayeen operational area is defined as all territory west of a line drawn through Ramtha, Irbid, Jerash, Salt and Wadi Musa. The preamble makes it clear that the agreement is to be read in conjunction with the Cairo agreement of 27 September and the agreement on the withdrawal of the forces of the two sides of 1 October. Altogether, they form the most comprehensive system for regulating relations between the two sides that has yet been agreed.

3. The commitment to Palestinian self-determination in article 4 of Chapter I has not appeared previously in a government-fedayeen agreement. The wording of this provision will stand more than one interpretation. However, King Hussein in his radio and television broadcast the day after the agreement was signed (our telegram 808 of 15 October) put his own gloss on it and said that when the West Bank was liberated, the people would

/have

C.W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



SECRET



have the right to choose for themselves what sort of regime they wanted. This undertaking is of course not new and many Palestinians regard it with considerable scepticism. However, their best guarantee, ironically, will probably be that any peace settlement will prohibit the movement on to the West Bank of any heavy military equipment, without which it would be virtually impossible for King Hussein to re-establish his authority there against Palestinian wishes.

4. Another significant point is the extent to which the new agreement makes the Central Committee responsible for the revolution as a whole. This was expressed in general terms in the agreement of 10 July (which followed the June fighting), but now the Committee has undertaken to set up a General Command to control all the forces of the Palestine Revolution. It is to the Central Committee that the rights detailed in articles 1 to 3 of Chapter II are given, and the privileges in Chapter IV are granted to the "forces of the Revolution", who are to be under the control of the Committee's General Command. The only fedayeen organisations recognised in the agreement are the Central Committee, its "Principal Institutions" and the P.L.A. The phrase "fedayeen organisations" does not occur at all, and what rights (if any) they have to independent activity is undefined. The government have here a powerful lever against the extremist organisations, who are the most prone to act independently of the Central Committee, and may claim that they have no right of independent action at all. If they follow this line with determination, the long-term effects could be considerable.

5. The status of the fedayeen militia under the agreement is still not clear. I think Chapter II article 4 must be read as meaning that the militia is not to be considered part of the "forces of the Palestine Revolution" and therefore not entitled to the privileges granted to these forces in Chapter IV of the agreement. The militia is, however, permitted to "perform its work in complete

/freedom

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freedom" (Chapter II, article 9), a wording which can be interpreted in several ways, especially in the light of the proviso about sovereignty and the limits of the law in article 7 of the same Chapter. For instance, is the militia permitted to keep its arms? Ibrahim Bakr in his press conference said that it was, but this leaves it open whether the arms are to be held by individuals or by the organisations to which they belong. But the government may not share Ibrahim Bakr's interpretation and it has not in the agreement committed itself to anything that would prevent it, for instance, from confiscating arms found in the possession of the militia. Given the militia's considerable trouble-making potential, this looks like being a fruitful area for disagreement between the two sides.

6. The vagueness of Chapter II article 9 also affects "Fatah" newspaper. A row appears to be going on as to whether or not "Fatah" is subject to the Jordanian press laws. Reliable reports ascribe at least one of the minor clashes of the past week to an attempt to print and distribute and edition of the paper.

7. The government has, it seems, pinned the fedayeen down on many more points than it did in July. The July agreement, given sufficient bad faith, could be read as allowing the fedayeen a wide degree of freedom outside the limits of the law, and indeed large sections of the agreement were totally ignored (e.g. the provision prohibiting fedayeen military bases in towns - the equivalent provisions in the new agreement presumably list the sites themselves, and will be more difficult for the fedayeen to wriggle out of). As in July, implementation is all important. The degree of trust between the two sides is minimal. However, the presence of the Higher Arab Committee and the military observers, coupled with the warning to malefactors in article 13 of the Cairo agreement

/seems

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seems for the moment to be ensuring a certain degree of good behaviour on the part of the erstwhile combatants. But after the committee and the observers have left, the implementation of the agreement will depend on each side's assessment of what it can get away with. It is then that we shall see the extent to which the recent fighting has altered the balance of power in the country.

Yours ever,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to read "Jimmy Carter".

(C.P. Carter)

Copies to: JIS(NE)  
MOD DI4  
Chanceries  
Beirut  
Cairo  
Tel Aviv  
Baghdad

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*With the compliments of*

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
OFFICE

LONDON, S.W.1



Touo 433 gone to

NET 17/1



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424

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT/A  
ROUTINE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 838

TO F.C.O.  
26 OCTOBER 1970

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 10 26 OCT 1970 NES 1/4
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P-  
3/11

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261200Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 838 DATED 26 OCTOBER 1970 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD JIS NE AND MOD DI4

(422)  
CARTER'S LETTER 1/1 OF 23 OCTOBER TO LONG. NEO.  
THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT (APART FROM SECTION III) HAS BEEN PUBLISHED  
IN 'FATAH' NEWSPAPER. PLEASE RECLASSIFY LETTER UNDER REFERENCE  
CONFIDENTIAL AND ENCLOSURE UNCLASSIFIED. THE FOLLOWING  
AMENDMENTS SHOULD BE MADE TO THE TRANSLATED TEXT:-

CHAPTER II, ARTICLE 7, FOR 'AND ITS OBSERVANCE' READ  
'WITH DUE REGARD TO THE EXCEPTIONS NEEDED FOR FEDAYEEN ACTION'.

CHAPTER II, ARTICLE 9(B) FOR 'ARTICLES (A) (B) AND (C)' READ  
'ARTICLES (A) (B) AND (E).

DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE TO JIS NE AND MOD DI4

FCO PASS TO DEFCONCEN

MR. STRACHAN

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FILES  
N.E. DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

FFFFF



CYPHER CAT/A

PRIORITY AMMAN TO MOD

TELEGRAM NO. 301000Z OCTOBER 1970

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CONFIDENTIAL.

301000Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO 301000Z OCT 70 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION ROUTINE TO FCO BEIRUT TEL AVIV BAGHDAD CAIRO JIS(NE)  
AND JIS(GULF).

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
- 2 NOV 1970  
NEJ 1/4

JORDAN INTERNAL.

NO OFFICIAL ARMY SPOKESMAN STATEMENT HAS BEEN ISSUED ABOUT  
THE FIRING IN AMMAN LAST NIGHT WHICH WAS THE MOST PROLONGED SINCE  
THE CIVIL WAR LAST MONTH.

2.. SMALL ARMS FIRING BROKE OUT AT 1615 HRS ON 29 OCTOBER AND  
OCCASIONAL BURSTS COULD BE HEARD UP TO 2100 HRS FROM VARIOUS AREAS  
BUT CHIEFLY FROM THE TOWN CENTRE, AND BETWEEN THERE AND THE  
STATION. A POINT FIVE CALIBRE MEDIUM GUN WAS HEARD.

3.. THE REPORTS WE HAVE INDICATE THAT A FEDAYEEN OFFICER APPEARED  
IN THE SOUK CARRYING A MACHINE GUN.  
WHEN CHALLENGED BY THE POLICE HE COULD PRODUCE NO AUTHORISATION.  
HE OPENED FIRE AND TRIED TO ESCAPE BUT WAS SHOT.  
LATER AN ANTI TANK ROCKET WAS FIRED AT A POLICE VEHICLE, WHICH GOT  
BURNT, AND ONE POLICEMAN WAS KILLED. AS A RESULT OF THESE  
INCIDENTS THERE WAS SOME FIRING FROM QUOTE "SYMPATHISERS" UNQUOTE.

4.. THIS MORNING TRAFFIC IS MOVING NORMALLY AND THERE ARE NO  
OUTWARD SIGNS OF TENSION IN THE TOWN.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 AND ROUTINE TO JIS(NE) AND JIS  
GULF.

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN

MR. STRACHAN

FCO/WHI.DISTRIBUTION [SENT TO D.C.C.]

N.E.D.

CONFIDENTIAL



EN CLAIR

ROUTINE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 854

TO F.C.O.

30 OCTOBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED.

300740Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 854 DATED 30 OCTOBER 1970  
FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV.

426

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211

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 2 NOV 1970
NES 114 THE KING

MY TEL 849. OF 27 OCTOBER.

IN HIS LETTER OF ASSIGNMENT TO THE NEW PRIME MINISTER  
MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

- (1) ONE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S MAIN RESPONSIBILITIES WAS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENTS WITH THE FEDAYEEN.
- (2) THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK FOR THE LIBERATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY, AND SHOULD "EXTEND A HAND OF HONOURABLE CO-OPERATION TO OUR BROTHERS" ON THE EASTERN FRONT.
- (3) THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK FOR NATIONAL UNITY AND STRIKE WITH AN IRON FIST AT THE "OPPORTUNISTS, ROTTEN AND IMMORAL PEOPLE" WHO SPREAD RUMOURS AND SOW DISCORD.
- (4) THERE HAD BEEN RECENTLY PEOPLE IN OFFICIAL, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BODIES WHO HAD NOT CARRIED OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD THEREFORE REVISE AND RE-ORGANISE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENTS.
- (5) THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD RECONSTRUCT WHAT HAS BEEN DESTROYED, AND SHOULD START PLANS FOR MODERNIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
- (6) THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE SUPPLIED WITH THE EQUIPMENT THEY NEED

MR STRACHAN

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.



CYPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 856

30 OCTOBER 1970

427

CONFIDENTIAL.

TOP COPY

300955Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 856 DATED 30 OCTOBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION ROUTINE TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK..

MY TEL NO 849. OF 29 SEPTEMBER.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
- NOV 1970  
NES 1/4

THE NEW CABINET LOOKS STRONG RIGHT WING AND BY JORDANIAN STANDARDS COMPETENT. WASFI AL-TELL IS AN ABLE ADMINISTRATOR WITH A REPUTATION FOR KEEPING HIS COLLEAGUES HARD AT WORK. MOST OF HIS CABINET ARE 'TECHNOCRATS' RATHER THAN POLITICIANS E.G. OMAR ABDULLAH IS A FORMER HEAD OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES AUTHORITY AND DIRECTOR OF THE PHOSPHATES COMPANY, IBRAHIM HABASHNEH IS A FORMER DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF RAILWAYS, ADNAN ABU AUDEH IS IIR-TRAINED AND ENERGETIC, ABDUL SALAM AL-MAJALI HAS BEEN AN EFFECTIVE MINISTER OF HEALTH IN PREVIOUS CABINETS, AND WAS FORMERLY DIRECTOR OF ARMY MEDICAL SERVICES.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT SEEMS MORE LIKELY THAN MOST TO PUSH AHEAD VIGOROUSLY WITH RECONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

2.. EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE CABINET ARE FROM THE WEST BANK, AND NINE FROM THE EAST BANK. NONE OF THE FORMER ARE NOTED FOR PRO-FEDAYEEN SYMPATHIES. ABU AUDEH, AL-AJLUNI AND WASFI AL-TELL HIMSELF ARE WELL-KNOWN HARDLINERS ON THE FEDAYEEN ISSUE AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT THEY INTEND TO ENFORCE FEDAYEEN ADHERENCE TO THE AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE REMOVAL OF ARMED FEDAYEEN FROM THE TOWNS. UNLIKE THE ABDUL MUN'IM AL-RIFA'I CABINET FORMED AFTER THE JUNE FIGHTING, THIS IS NOT A CABINET OF CONCILIATION. THE FEDAYEEN ARE UNLIKELY TO BE PLEASED WITH IT FOR WHICH THEY MUST KNOW THAT, WHEN IT COMES TO THE CRUNCH, IT IS THE ATTITUDE OF THE PALACE, NOT THE GOVERNMENT, THAT COUNTS. THE COMPOSITION OF THE LATTER NORMALLY REFLECTS THE INTENTIONS OF THE FORMER.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR. STRACHAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 867


TO F.C.O.  
4 NOVEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

840730Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 867 DATED 4 NOVEMBER 1970 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV MOD DI4 AND  
JI S(NE)

JORDAN INTERNAL.



THE MOST SEVERE CLASH SINCE THE SEPTEMBER FIGHTING BROKE OUT  
IN THE CENTRE OF AMMAN AT ABOUT 1300 HRS YESTERDAY.

2. SPORADIC FIRING SPREAD QUICKLY TO OTHER PARTS OF THE CITY,  
A STRAY BULLET FROM ONE BURST HITTING THE EMBASSY.  
FIRING CONTINUED INTERMITTENTLY UNTIL EARLY THIS MORNING.

3. I SHALL BE SENDING YOU A FULL REPORT AS SOON AS DA STAFF  
HAVE BEEN BRIEFED BY THE D.M.I..  
THE CITY SEEMS NORMAL THIS MORNING BUT I AM BOUND TO SAY THAT THE  
SECURITY SITUATION HERE AS OF NOW DOES NOT LOOK VERY ENCOURAGING  
DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DI4 AND JI(NE)

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE DEFCOMCEN

pr  
10/11

MR. STRACHAN

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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(429)

Answered (orally)

R.E.

28/10.



BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

*pm*


1 October, 1970 6/11

*Enter and x.*

*Dear Peter,*

PERSONAL

Just a very brief letter which I hope to get away by casual courier tomorrow to enable you to understand - you probably will anyway - that although the firing has stopped conditions are still not conducive to balanced and reflective reporting. I am afraid that for some time to come we may have to keep you on rather short commons, in the form of ad hoc summaries by telegram. My attempt at a first impressions despatch, which was to include a bit of forecasting, was interrupted after three or four paragraphs by the civil war, and any element of forecasting in its resumption will have been further complicated by the death of Nasser.



But apart from the continuing curfew between dusk and dawn, the major inhibiting factor on output is the absence of electric power. Apart from a generator which keeps our DWS communications going, together with lighting in the Registry and another office, we are back to candles and butties in the rest of Chancery and in our houses. This is of course a strain on the eyes so our productive hours tend to coincide with the daylight ones. Ahmed Fawzi said yesterday that it would be two months at least before power could be restored so we shall probably have to try to get some more generators going (we had a one-kilowatt job at the Residence for two nights but it has packed up).

The weather turned appreciably colder two days ago and soon the lack of heating will be felt as much as the lack of lights and refrigerators. This letter is not intended as a grouse but as an explanation. The chaps are in pretty good heart but, not surprisingly, some of them are feeling the strain a bit.

*Yours ever,*

*J.F.S.*

(J.F.S. Phillips)

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED



Answered (orally)

R.E.

28/10



BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

PERSONAL AND UNCLASSIFIED

9 October, 1970

pt  
6/11

Enter and X.

Dear Peter,

This is just to let you know, as a follow up to my personal letter of 1 October about working and living conditions here following the battle, that electricity and telephones are working again at this end of Amman. So our only remaining excuse for inefficiency is the curfew, which is still in force.

I hope to see you towards the end of the month.

Yours ever,

Bm.

(J.F.S. Phillips)

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

P.S. I have at last returned my "First Impressions"  
I hope to send it by next Prof. Bag. It will be a  
poorly composition I fear?



EN CLAIR  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 869

TO F.C.O.  
4 NOVEMBER 1970

430

UNCLASSIFIED.

041045Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 869 DATED 4 NOVEMBER 1970 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO MOD D14(PRIORITY) AND ROUTINE TO JIS(NE)  
BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV.

428

431

6/11

NE J1/4

MY TEL NO 867 AND AA'S TELL FOH 041030Z

JORDAN INTERNAL:

"FATEH" NEWSPAPER GIVES THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF YESTERDAY'S  
INCIDENTS.

TWO ARMED FEDAYEEN WERE FIRED ON BY SECURITY FORCES IN CENTRAL  
AMMAN AT ABOUT 12.30 HRS LOCAL AFTER THE SECURITY FORCES HAD TRIED  
TO ARREST THEM. ONE WAS KILLED AND THE OTHER WOUNDED.

A LIEUTENANT IN THE SECURITY FORCES THEN KILLED THE WOUNDED MAN.  
THE PAPER ADMITS THAT THE TWO FEDAYEEN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN  
CARRYING ARMS, BUT SAYS THAT THE SECURITY FORCES SHOULD HAVE  
DEALT WITH THEM DIFFERENTLY. FIRING THEN SPREAD, AND THE  
SECURITY FORCES AT THE CITADEL CONCENTRATED THEIR FIRE ON THE HQ  
OF THE PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

2. MEANWHILE THE LIEUTENANT WHO HAD KILLED THE WOUNDED MAN TOOK  
REFUGE IN A BANK (THE BRITISH BANK OF THE MIDDLE EAST, WE UNDER-  
STAND). EVENTUALLY OFFICERS OF THE ARAB TRUCE SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE  
REMOVED HIM AND TOOK HIM TO HIS HQ, WHERE THE TRUCE SUPERVISORY  
OFFICERS WERE ATTACKED AND WOUNDED. THE TRUCE SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE  
WAS INCENSED AT THIS AND WANTED TO WITHDRAW ITS MEMBERS FROM JORDAN,  
BUT WERE LATER PERSUADED NOT TO DO SO. THE NEWSPAPER ESTIMATES  
CASUALTIES AS 15 CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS KILLED OR WOUNDED, AND SAYS  
THAT THE MASSES SET FIRE TO 4 PUBLIC SECURITY VEHICLES.

3. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS ASKED THE HIGHER ARAB COMMITTEE TO  
INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENTS.  
DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD D14 AND ROUTINE TO JIS(NE)

MR. STRACHAN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

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N.A.D.

ARABIAN DEPT

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G.I.P.D.

I.R.D.

NEWS DEPT

H.O.D. (INTERNAL)



AT 1630(LOCAL) ARMED CIVILIANS OPENED FIRE IN THE MAJIN QUARTER (BY THE ITALIAN HOSPITAL) ONTO THE POLICE POST AND AT THE SAME TIME ONTO A CAR OF ARAB TRUCE SUPERVISORY OFFICERS WHO WERE APPROACHING THE BRITISH BANK IN SALT STREET TO INVESTIGATE THE FIRING. GLASS WAS BROKEN BUT THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES IN EITHER CASE.

AT 1800(LOCAL) AN RPG SHELL WAS FIRED AT THE CAR OF THE COMMANDER OF THE BADIA POLICE NEXT TO THE HQ OF THE DESERT POLICE ON JEBEL ASHRAFIYA. GLASS WAS BROKEN BUT NO CASUALTIES. WHILE WE DEPLORE THESE REGRETTABLE INCIDENTS AND CONDEMN THE PERPETRATORS WHO CAUSED THE DEATH OR INJURY OF A NUMBER OF CITIZENS AND MEMBERS OF THE ARMY AND PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES, WE WISH TO RE-AFFIRM THAT THE SECURITY FORCES WERE ABLE TO CONTAIN THE CRISIS AND CONTROL THE SITUATION AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE FOR THE CITIZENS.

END OF STATEMENT.

2. AA AND AMA ARE CALLING ON DMI AT 1200HRS(LOCAL) TODAY TO OBTAIN DETAILS OF FIRING WHICH OCCURED AFTER 1800 HRS LOCAL.

DEFCOMCEN PASS ROUTINE TO JIS(NE) AND PRIORITY TO MODUK

MR. STRACHAN

FILES:

N.E.D.  
DEFENCE DEPT  
N.A.D.  
ARABIAN DEPT

G.I.P.D.  
I.R.D.  
NEWS DEPT



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EN CLAIR  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO FOH 041030Z

TO MOD UK DI4  
NOVEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED.

041030Z

ADDRESSED TO MODUK DI4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 041030Z NOV 70 AND TO  
FCO REPEATED FOR INFORMATION ROUTINE TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV AND  
JIS(NE)

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY TO  
NET 114

428

FROM AA AMMAN. FURTHER TO AMMAN TEL 867 JORDAN INTERNAL:

1. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF THE  
INTERIOR LAST NIGHT.

"AT 1255(LOCAL TIME) IN FAISAL STREET (THE MAIN STREET OF THE  
SUQ), PERSONS IN A MERCEDES CAR OPENED FIRE ON A POLICE PATROL  
KILLING ONE OF ITS MEMBERS. THIS COMPELLED THE POLICE TO RETURN  
FIRE RESULTING IN THE KILLING OF THE DRIVER OF THE MERCEDES BUT  
THE PASSENGERS ESCAPED. AT THE SAME TIME, FIRE WAS OPENED ON  
POLICE PATROLS FROM A NUMBER OF PLACES INCLUDING CAFES, HOTELS  
AND SIDE STREETS BY ARMED ELEMENTS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES.  
FIRE WAS LATER EXTENDED INTO OTHER PARTS OF THE CAPITAL. THE FIRE  
FROM AUTOMATIC WEAPONS WAS DIRECTED AGAINST PUBLIC SECURITY CENTRES.  
ARMED CIVILIANS ALSO BURNED A MILITARY POLICE VEHICLE WHICH PARKED  
IN FAISAL STREET.

AT 1430(LOCAL) FIRE WAS OPENED ON AN UNARMED SOLDIER WHO WAS  
GOING TO HIS HOUSE IN JEBEL HUSSEIN. HE WAS KILLED. A CORPORAL  
STANDING OUTSIDE HIS POST IN JEBEL HUSSEIN WAS ALSO SHOT AND KILLED.

LATER FIRE WAS OPENED IN JEBEL HUSSEIN ONTO A LAND ROVER AND  
3 TON VEHICLE BELONGING TO THE ARMY NEAR THE HUSSEIN COLLEGE.  
ARMED CIVILIANS LATER SET FIRE TO THESE TWO VEHICLES.

AT 1500(LOCAL) A POLICE RECOVERY VEHICLE WHICH ENTERED THE  
TOWN TO RECOVER THE BURNT CAR WAS ALSO DESTROYED AND BURNT BY  
ARMED CIVILIANS. / AT 1630(LOCAL)



4. DDMI WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE SITUATION. HE SAID THEY EXPECTED THESE INCIDENTS TO CONTINUE FOR ABOUT SIX MONTHS BUT THAT RECORDS CAPTURED DURING THE SEPTEMBER FIGHTING HAD MADE IT EASIER TO GET INFORMATION AND OPERATE AGAINST GROUPS NOT CONFORMING TO THE CEASE-FIRE.

5. DDMI STATED THAT THE PUBLIC SECURITY ORGANISATION IN AMMAN WAS BEING OVERHAULED AND THAT STEPS WERE BEING TAKEN TO INCREASE CONTROL IN ORDER TO MINIMISE SUCH OUTBREAKS.

6. COMMENT:

WE HAVE HEARD FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT TWO POLICE OFFICES WERE ARRESTED FOR OVER-REACTING DURING YESTERDAY'S INCIDENTS. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD FROM A HIGH LEVEL THAT STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO ASSERT CLOSER CONTROL OVER INDIVIDUAL POLICE PATROLS WHO HAVE HITHERTO BEEN SOMEWHAT ISOLATED.

7. AMA TOURED TOWN AT 1100Z TRAFFIC WAS ALMOST NORMAL AND PEDESTRIAN ACTIVITY AND SHOPPING COMPLETELY NORMAL.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD UK DI4 AND JIS(NE)

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN

MR. STRACHAN

(SENT TO D.C.C.)

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PHER CAT/A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (U.K.)

TELEGRAM NO FOH 041215Z

NOVEMBER 1970

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041215Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DIA TELEGRAM NO FOH 041215Z NOV 70 AND TO FCO  
BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV JIS(NE)

FROM AMA AMMAN.

RECEIVED IN REGISTERED - 5 - NEJ1/4
--

pr - 6/11

JORDAN INTERNAL.

AA AND AMA SAW COLONEL ABOUD SALEM DDMI AT 1200 LOCAL TODAY  
(THE DMI WAS ATTENDING A MEETING OF THE MILITARY FOLLOW-UP  
COMMITTEE)

2. DDMI SAID THAT THE INCIDENTS YESTERDAY AND ON 29 OCT HAD BEEN  
PLANNED BY FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS WHO WERE NOT COOPERATING WITH THE  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND WERE ORGANISED BY A PROMINANT MEMBER OF FATEH  
(DDMI WOULD NOT DISCLOSE HIS IDENTITY BUT SAID WE PROBABLY KNEW  
HIM). RADIO INTERCEPTS HAD PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF THIS PLANNING  
WHICH WAS HE SAID DESIGNED TO PLACE THE PRIME MINISTER IN A BAD  
POSITION AND FORCE THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO REACT STRONGLY.  
*whilst the three Arab Heads of State are meeting in Cairo.*  
AS A RESULT IT WAS GOVERNMENT INTENTION TO 'PLAY IT COOL'.  
DDMI CONFIRMED THE IMPRESSION ALREADY GAINED BY MEMBERS OF THIS  
EMBASSY STAFF THAT BOTH YESTERDAY AND ON 29 OCT FIRING HAD STARTED  
SIMULTANEOUSLY FROM DIFFERENT AREAS ON A GIVEN SIGNAL.

3. DDMI GAVE CASUALTIES IN THE SUK AS SEVEN ARMY AND POLICE  
WOUNDED AND TWO CIVILIANS KILLED AND ONE WOUNDED AND ON JEBEL  
HUSSEIN AS TWO ARMY AND POLICE KILLED. HE SAID THAT TWO PASSENGERS  
FROM THE MERCEDES CAR (SEE OUR TEL FOH 041030Z) HAD BEEN ARRESTED  
AND WOULD BE TRIED. A CAR (POSSIBLY STOLEN FROM THE BRITISH BANK  
MANAGER) HAD BEEN USED FOR THE GETAWAY BUT HAD BEEN APPREHENDED  
AND THE OCCUPANTS ARRESTED. THE PERSONS WHO SET FIRE TO THE ARMY  
VEHICLES ON JEBEL HUSSEIN HAD ALSO BEEN ARRESTED.

/4. DDMI WAS

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EXAMINERS

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IMMEDIATE F C O

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CYPHER CAT/A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO MOD DI4

TELEGRAM NO 050705Z

NOVEMBER 1970

*pr*  
*un*  
*.6/11*

RESTRICTED.

050705Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO 050705Z NOV 70 AND TO FCO BEIRUT  
CAIRO TEL AVIV JIS(NE).

FROM AMA AMMAN.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

MY TEL FOH 041215Z PARA TWO AFTER WORD "STRONGLY" PLEASE INSERT  
WHILST THE THREE ARAB HEADS OF STATE ARE MEETING IN CAIRO

OMISSION REGRETTE.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DI4 AND JIS(NE)

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN

MR STRACHAN

ATTO D

NNNN



JORDAN CABINET - 26 September, 1970

Ahmed Touqan	Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Yahya Khalib	Minister of Communications and Public Works
Sami Ayoub	Minister of Agriculture
Fawwaz Rouaissan	Qadi al Qudat and Minister of Waqfs
* Brig. Mazen Ajlouni	Minister of State for Prime Minister's Office Affairs
* Brig. Saleh Shareh	Minister of the Interior
* Col. Ya'coub Abu Ghosh	Minister of Health
* Maj. Mufleh Awadallah	Minister of the Interior (Rural and Municipal Affairs)
* Maj. Adnan Abu Audeh	Minister of Information
Akkash al-Zain	Minister of Defence
Fuad Kakish	Minister of Transport, Labour and Social Affairs
Abdel Majid Sharidah	Minister of Education
Omar al-Nabulsi	Minister of National Economy

\* = in old Cabinet



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Useful. (ii) *Mr Evans*  
(i) *E. G. R. L. 5/11.*  
BRITISH EMBASSY, *am*  
AMMAN. *434* 30/10

(1/1)

22 October, 1970

Dear Christopher,

NET 1/4

The following appointments in the Royal Court were announced on 19 October:-

- (a) Ahmad Tarawaneh as Head of the Royal Diwan replacing Ahmed Touqan, the present Prime Minister, who however had only held the post for a few weeks. Touqan's predecessor was Zeid al-Rifa'i, now ambassador-designate in London. Tarawaneh was formerly a "Special Adviser" at the palace, and a member of the Privy Council formed on 3 September (our telegram No. 455 of 4 September) and of the Higher National Guidance Council under the chairmanship of Suleiman al-Nabulsi, formed on 5 September. See Leading Personalities report No. 105.
- (b) Madar Badran as Chief Chamberlain to His Majesty replacing Field Marshal Habis al-Majali. Badran was Head of the General Intelligence Service until relieved of his post on 2 August and replaced by Col. Nadhir Amr. See Leading Personalities report No. 27.
- (c) Mureiwid al-Tell as Secretary General of the Royal Diwan. He is the younger brother of Wasfi al-Tell, the former Prime Minister (Leading Personalities report No. 106) who is still a powerful figure in palace affairs. Mureiwid is an L.S.E. graduate, formerly head of U.N. Section in the M.F.A. and until his new appointment was Chief of Protocol at the Palace. (He is also my landlord!)
- (d) Hani al-Khasawaneh as Chief of Royal Protocol, replacing Mureiwid al-Tell. No details about him are yet available.

/2. Another

C.W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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2. Another recent appointment of interest is that of Ali Abu Nuwar (Leading Personalities report No. 16) as "personal representative of H.M. The King", which is probably an indication that he has been returned to favour, and may be a stepping stone to a higher appointment.

3. Altogether this is a pretty mixed bunch. Mureiwid al-Tell and Madar Badran are both able and intelligent. Ahmad Tarawaneh is a schemer of the old school. Ali Abu Nuwar is very intelligent, able (though erratic) and thoroughly untrustworthy. Hani al-Khasawaneh is still an unknown quantity. It is doubtful how much influence any of these men will have on the King and his policy. None of the palace posts have much intrinsic power; the degree of influence exerted by their incumbents depends entirely on their own personalities. The King is clearly still playing the age-old game of shuffling his advisers around so that none of them gets too much influence or popularity.

--- 4. We did not, I think, inform you of the details of the new government formed on 26 September under Ahmed Touqan. I now enclose a copy of our duplicated list of the current cabinet. Since then, of course, Ahmed Touqan has taken over the job of Governor General from Field Marshal Habis al-Majali, clearly a step intended to fulfil the terms of Article 12 of the Cairo agreement by ending military rule (or at least giving the impression of doing so). Ahmed Touqan is now Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Governor General. In most other countries this would indicate very considerable political power, but is not of great significance here.

Yours ever,

(C.P. Carter)

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Tel Aviv



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IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 881

TO F.C.O.  
9 NOVEMBER 1970

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090800Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 881 DATED 9 NOVEMBER 1970. REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD AND  
WASHINGTON.

RECEIVED IN  
REG. IN 11/10  
NES 1/4

YOU SHOULD KNOW, IN CASE THERE ARE EXAGGERATED PRESS REPORTS  
THAT TODAY ~~9 OCTOBER~~ <sup>NOVEMBER</sup> IS THE DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF MEASURES  
AGREED TWO WEEKS AGO IN THE "AMMAN PROTOCOL" (OUR TEL 836)  
GOVERNING CONTROL OF FEDAYEEN, THEIR DOCUMENTATION AND THE EXTENT  
TO WHICH THEY MAY CARRY ARMS, WEAR UNIFORMS ETC. IN AMMAN.

2. THERE IS FAIRLY WIDESPREAD ANXIETY ARISING FROM THE EXPECTAT-  
ION THAT A NUMBER OF FEDAYEEN WILL NOT HAVE COMPLIED AND THAT THE  
SECURITY FORCES WILL "LEAN ON THEM" (AS ONE OFFICER HAS PUT IT)  
TO DO SO. THIS MAY WELL LEAD TO FIREWORKS OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF  
DAYS BUT HAVING NOW PERSONALLY SPOKEN TO SOME OF THOSE MOST LIKELY  
TO BE INVOLVED AND ANSWERABLE, I EXPECT THEM IF THEY HAPPEN TO  
BE CONTAINED AND CONFINED TO CERTAIN NOTORIOUS AREAS (E.G. ASHRAFIA  
AND JEBEL TAJ) ALTHOUGH TROUBLE MAY SPILL OVER INTO THE MAIN MARKET.  
WE SHALL OF COURSE BE ON THE ALERT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE PRECAUTIONS.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON

MR. PHILLIPS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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3.. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.  
FEARS ABOUT DISTURBANCES ON 9 NOVEMBER WERE GROUNDLESS.  
FROM THAT DAY ON, THE JORDANIAN SECURITY FORCES ALONE,  
WITHOUT THE ARAB MILITARY OBSERVER MISSION, WOULD BE AUTHORISED  
TO KEEP ORDER. THEY WOULD DEAL WITH ALL VIOLATIONS CONCERNING  
EXPLOSIVES AND ARMS.  
THE FEDAYEEN MILITIA WOULD BE GIVEN PERMITS TO KEEP THEIR ARMS  
IN THEIR HOMES: OTHERWISE THEY WOULD OBSERVE ALL THE LAWS OF  
THE STATE. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT ISOLATED CLASHES MIGHT OCCUR,  
BUT THEY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH WITH CALM AND CAUTION.  
IT WAS NOT JUST THE ARMY AND THE FEDAYEEN, HOWEVER, WHO CARRIED ARMS:  
'THERE ARE OTHERS WHO CARRY ARMS, AND WE MUST BE CAREFULL'.  
THE ZIONIST ENEMY AND CERTAIN FOREIGN QUARTERS WERE INTERESTED IN  
SEEING INTERNAL DISPUTES CONTINUE.

4.. THERE WAS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE  
FOR NATIONAL UNITY AND THE KING'S PLEDGE THAT THE PALESTINIANS  
WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THE LATTER  
WOULD BE EFFECTIVE AFTER THE LIBERATION OF OCCUPIED LAND.

5.. KUWAIT WAS ABOUT TO RESUME HER AID TO JORDAN: HE WAS SURE THAT  
CONTACTS WITH THE LIBYANS, WHICH WERE ABOUT TO START, WOULD LEAD  
TO A RESUMPTION OF AID. HE HOPED TO VISIT CAIRO AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE.

6.. IN ACCEPTING THE US INITIATIVE, JORDAN AND THE UAR WERE MAKING  
A POLITICAL MOVE DIRECTED ONLY AT REMOVING THE CONSEQUENCES OF  
THE 1967 WAR. THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RESULTS OF  
THE JUNE WAR AND THE ESSENCE OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEMS:  
THE LATTER WAS STILL IN QUESTION.

DEFCOMCEN PASS TO JIS(NE) AND MOD 14

MR. PHILLIPS

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ARAB - ISRAEL DISPUTE



EN CLAIR  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 885

TO F.C.O.

9 NOVEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED.

091015Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 885 DATED 9 NOVEMBER 1970 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO ROUTINE BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV TRIPOLI  
JIS(NE) MOD14

PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

WASFI TELL HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 7 NOVEMBER.  
HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD WORK FOR NATIONAL UNITY, ESPECIALLY  
BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE FEDAYEEN AND FOR ARAB CO-OPERATION,  
ESPECIALLY WITH THE UAR. IT WOULD IMPLEMENT THE CAIRO AND AMMAN  
AGREEMENTS, DESPITE THE EFFORTS OF "MORE THAN ONE PARTY" TO  
UNDERMINE THEM.

2. THE MAIN LINES OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S POLICY WERE:-

- (A) TO RE-ESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER.
- (B) TO SUPPORT THE ARMY AND THE "POPULAR ARMY"  
(? THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED MILITIA?) AND SUPPLY THEM WITH  
TRAINING, EXPERIENCE AND WEAPONS.
- (C) TO ELIMINATE CORRUPTION.
- (D) TO REFORM GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS.
- (E) TO DRAW UP A PRODUCTION PLAN.
- (F) TO PURSUE A MODERN POLICY REGARDING SOCIAL SERVICES, SOCIAL  
SECURITY AND WAGES AND PRICES.

/3. IN



A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAEL

NES 1/4

438

Syrian View of British Middle East MovesDamascus home service in Arabic 12.15 GMT 7.11.70

Excerpts from commentary "What is behind the new British move in the Arab homeland?":

There is a new sign that Britain is trying to practise international politics in a manner that will reassert its role as a major imperialist State. This trend in policy emerged towards the end of the Labour Government's term and has become more prominent in the current Conservative era. The most prominent characteristic of the new attempt is evident in the increasing co-ordination with US policy in reversing the decision to withdraw British forces from East of Suez...

Zionist quarters have protested against what they called new British attitudes towards the Middle East problem and particularly against the speeches of the British Foreign Secretary and the British permanent UN delegate. If we take a close look at the two speeches in question and at the reason given by the Zionist quarters for their protest we find that a new, serious game is being prepared in the area. In fact there is no new British attitude towards the Middle East problem. The speeches made by British officials merely confirm Britain's former attitudes which are hostile to the Arab nation. British officials themselves have asserted that there is no change in their policy towards the Arab-Zionist conflict and that they do not intend to make any such change.

The fabricated Zionist uproar has been created according to a plan in which the parties, which all follow the same policy, are to play different roles. It is meant to help carry out British policy in the Arab countries by falsely depicting it as running contrary to Zionist interests...

The emergence of the new hypocritical trend in British policy has been accompanied by increased British activity in recent days. The old imperialist State is playing a dangerous game in the Arabian Gulf area. It is trying by all means to create political changes that would enable it to preserve and strengthen the influence of monopolies. This is in addition to increasing British activities throughout the Arab homeland.

In fact the new imperialist policy is based on two points at present: first, strengthening the Zionist State in every respect and enhancing its role as an advanced base for attacking the Arab liberation movement. Second, finding the best means to preserve monopolist interests in the Arab world so as to lessen the dangers to monopolist interests resulting from support to Zionism...

US and British moves and Zionist aggression essentially aim at subjugating our nation, dragging our homeland into spheres of influence, and imposing monopolist domination on the Arab countries. Our masses - which are engaged in a bitter struggle - know very well through their own experience how to thwart the designs of the imperialists.

Wasfi at-Tall on the Outlook for Jordan(a) Amman home service 10.00 GMT 7.11.70

Text of report of press statement by Premier Wasfi at-Tall on 7th November:

The Premier, Wasfi at-Tall, held a press conference at the Jordanian television building this morning. The conference was attended by a number of the Arab and foreign press and radio correspondents.



His Excellency began with a statement welcoming his audience. He said: HM King Husayn bestowed on me his precious confidence when he honoured me with the formation of the Government. I agreed to assume this responsibility because of my absolute confidence in my country's ability to resume its progress with more determination and greater effort after the known intrigue and the regrettable incidents with which this country has been afflicted. He added: The citizens - military men, civilians, and fida'iyin - equally share this ability. This is the Government's first weapon.

The second weapon, Tall said, is the convictions and principles on which the whole Jordanian entity depends at this stage when our country is confronting the most difficult challenges and dangers. These convictions and principles are represented in the following:

(1) Jordan is the starting point, the support and the root. This makes the Palestine question, for Jordan in particular, a question of life or death. Jordan belongs to the Palestinian as it belongs to the Jordanian, and Palestine belongs to the Jordanian as it belongs to the Palestinian.

(2) The Jordanian regime in all its structure, bases and establishments is one of the inevitabilities dictated by Jordan's vanguard and model role - on the level of construction and preparation on the one hand, and on the level of national action and the attainment of the national aims on the other.

(3) His Excellency said: These two convictions lead me to the third main conviction, that the entire Jordanian entity must have one purpose - the battle, which is the only correct purpose for our entire existence in this country. For me the foremost principle of the Government is that all of us in this country should reach the stage where the battle becomes the very essence of existence, life, action and production in every field and on all levels.

Premier Tall added: To me the main responsibility of the Government is to emphasise the meaning of order and to crystallise the sovereignty of law in our public life, because without order and law no real and competent force can build up the production of any people. A citizen living in a state of anarchy, anxiety and perplexity cannot contribute a single atom to the construction around him. In comparison, only a citizen living in real security is capable of contributing to production. His Excellency said: Force is not the only measure the Government adopts to achieve this objective - the real measure is the citizen's vigilance; awareness; faith in himself, his country and cause; determination to build and not demolish, and to give and not take; and, finally, his determination to triumph and not to be defeated again. When everybody - soldiers, civilians and fida'iyin - understands this, we shall have set our feet on the path leading to our aims of victory and liberation.

(4) The battle, which must become the purpose of our existence and life in this country, involves two inevitabilities which cannot be overlooked or denied if we wish to emerge triumphant. They are: the inevitability of domestic (Arabic: wataniyah) unity and the inevitability of Arab co-operation.

His Excellency declared the Government's determination to achieve Jordanian domestic (Arabic: wataniyah) unity on the strongest, firmest foundations. This naturally could not be achieved by a Ministerial decision or an administrative order, but it could be the inevitable outcome and sacred fruit of a sincere joint effort - a part of which would be carried out by the Government and the rest voluntarily and willingly by the people. He said: The Government will devote all its care and attention to developing the deep fraternity which must be established between the Army and the fida'iyin. This is the first, most sacred, and noblest duty.

Tall declared that the Government was determined to persevere to the utmost with Arab co-operation, mutual assistance among the brothers, and joint Arab action. He said: Co-operation, mutual assistance and joint action with the great sister, the UAR, will be our main concern. This is in accordance with the requirements and



prerequisites of the battle and in appreciation of the vanguard role which Egypt has carried out and is still carrying out in the Arabs' struggle against their enemies, and the great sacrifice which Egypt has offered in this struggle since the beginning.

Referring to the regrettable events in our country about six weeks ago, His Excellency said: These events were a departure from the general convictions and principles on which the Jordanian entity is based. His Excellency expressed his regret as follows: These events were an abnormal thing which should have not taken place. The logic of affairs and facts was quickly restored by the birth of the Cairo agreement, signed by the Arab leaders on 27th September, and by the Amman agreement, as well as the other agreements and protocols attached to it. All this constituted an important turning point in rectifying error, straightening crookedness, dispelling deviation, and barring the windows to evil and division.

Tall affirmed his determination to respect these agreements and to implement them to the letter and in spirit, because they represented the climax of the good and blessed return to the facts and bases represented in the convictions and principles of the Jordanian entity.

His Excellency said: The doors of conflict between the Army and the fida'iyin have been shut for ever, and the real fraternity between the Army and the fida'iyin has opened wide its doors. The Army and the fida'iyin will enter these doors side by side to go forward together to where it will be possible to realise their aspirations and materialise their hopes.

His Excellency added: HM King Husayn's comprehensive speech to the people on 14th October and the noble letter of designation on the basis of which the Cabinet was formed provide the main features of the Government's work. The Government will prepare a detailed military, administrative, constructional, political and propaganda plan. He added that the main duties of the Government were:

- (1) To establish stability, tranquillity, and the sovereignty of law and order.
- (2) To support fully the Army and the Popular Army [Jordanian Government militia (Arabic: Jaysh ash-Sha'b'i)] and make all possible efforts to strengthen their planning, training, experience, weapons, and fighting requirements.
- (3) To end bribery, corruption, laziness, negligence, evasion of taxes, exploitation and anarchy.
- (4) To carry out a comprehensive and radical reform in the machinery of the State.
- (5) To prepare a comprehensive production plan which will exploit all the resources and capacities.
- (6) To prepare a new policy of services to the citizens covering insurance, wages and prices.

His Excellency then answered the journalists' questions.

[Note: The radio announced that the remaining proceedings would be broadcast in later news bulletins.]

(b) Amman home service 12.00 GMT 7.11.70

Excerpts from report of questions and answers following Wasfi at-Tall's press statement (broadcast from a recording):

... [Question:] What is your opinion of the recent UN resolution on the Palestine question?



[Answer:] In my opinion, the resolution is good. This is the first time an Arab-initiated resolution has won a two-thirds majority. Besides the diplomatic and propaganda values of these resolutions and their value in explaining the justice of our cause to the world public, what transforms these resolutions into something tangible is our effort in the Arab world.

[Question:] There are rumours in the country that some politicians are thinking of forming a front to oppose the present Government. What is your opinion on this?

[Answer:] According to my information, some office-seekers have grouped together to form what I should call a front of office-seekers, not a political front. In any case, this is not the place for name-calling, but some of those joining in the front were largely responsible for the indecision which caused the recent dissension. They were largely responsible for the indecision which prevented our [State] organs from carrying out their duties properly. They were responsible for all the difficulties and hardships we are now facing. If the purpose is to open shops for rumours and for trading with this or that side, naturally we will not watch such groupings passively. We believe that our Ministerial plan is a national programme to which all efforts must be directed. If the purpose is positive participation, then anyone who wants to join together, participate, advise or offer constructive criticism is welcome. But if the purpose of the grouping is to cast doubts and to trade with Arab relations, the fida'i action or other matters, we will naturally not stand idle. In the past I personally refrained from entering into such questions, but the Cabinet and the Government are not there for their own comfort. They have serious work and face extremely grave dangers, and it is the duty of every citizen to participate in this work. Therefore, we will strike with an iron fist any distortion in the form of opportunism, office-seeking or fishing in troubled waters.

[Question:] You have said that indecision was one of the major factors which led to the catastrophe which befell our country, so do you believe that the Government - which has come to act firmly - must call to account the people who were responsible for the catastrophe, even if this was as a result of indecision?

[Answer:] Yes, we will call them to account.

[Question:] You have been accused of being behind the recent events. What is your comment on such talk?

[Answer:] I have heard this accusation from more than one quarter. Unfortunately, the accusation has been levelled by people who brought matters to the point of the indecision and chaos which caused the dissension. The same criminals responsible for the indecision are those who spread the rumours that such and such a person was responsible. If I were the only person responsible, it would be a thousand blessings for us. Wasfi at-Tall would disappear and the troubles would end. But what led us to the dissension was not this or that person but collective efforts to cause indecision and corruption, to trade with fida'i action, and to involve the fida'i action in domestic office-seeking issues.

[Question:] You are accused of Jordanian regionalism. How can you explain this?

[Answer:] I am a Jordanian, and I am proud of being a Jordanian Arab. I believe the Jordanians are the best and most conscientious (Arabic: aw'ahum) and patriotic Arabs. I am proud of them as Jordanians because Jordanian to them does not mean regionalism... I am proud of being a Jordanian but this does not fundamentally bear any regionalistic meaning... When the Arab world is mentioned we feel that we are a part of it... When I say I am a Jordanian I do not mean that I am a regional Jordanian but a Jordanian Arab, and I am proud of this description.

[Question:] You have announced that you will visit Cairo. Can you specify the date?



[Answer:] In the near future, God willing. When circumstances permit, I will visit fraternal Cairo.

[Question:] Your Excellency is known to be the only Premier who has kept up with the Palestine issue on the military, political and ideological levels since it began. Nonetheless, criticism and slander which should not be directed against a Premier are being directed against you. What is the reason for this in Your Excellency's view?

[Answer:] Such criticism and slander force me to make an attempt at self-defence, although I am usually reluctant to do so. I want my deeds to be my self-defence. However, I believe in the progress of the struggle march and that you may be hit by bullets or words. As for myself, whether fortunately or unfortunately, the bullets missed me but some words have struck home. I do not really know the reason for the insistence on accusing me.

However, I believe it is because I say what I believe. This pleases some people and antagonises others. This does not necessarily mean that what I say is right, but at least before I say it I usually think about it. I become convinced of it and I then feel that my duty and honour requires me to say it. I did learn how to be a flexible politician and how to appease the politicians and the public. I feel that I am an official whose duty is to serve people and not to play with their emotions. [Two sentences as received.] My duty is to tell people what is right, whether they cheer me or not. Therefore, one reason for such accusations is a product of errors in my training, errors connected with my frankness, and perhaps to some, cruelty and ferocity.

I believe another reason is that we are in a stage of political growth. The people who can see farther than others in this stage are usually not well thought of. People will later say that they wish they had believed this man and heeded his advice...

[Question:] Your Excellency, there are fears haunting popular circles about what will happen after 10th November, the end of the transitional period. Will you please explain to us what will happen after 10th November?

[Answer:] These fears are groundless. Several people have asked me what will happen after 9th November. I tell them nothing but good will happen. We have begun the gradual removal of special conditions, including military ones, in Amman and other cities. The date 9th November is when the security forces will assume their task, without the help of the supreme Arab follow-up committee, of evacuating all fighters from Amman in accordance with the protocol. This is what will happen on 9th November. There will then be a quicker return to normal life. There will be no new sensational or provocative measures. The point is that all violations connected with explosives, unlicensed weapons, and other violations will fall under the jurisdiction of the security forces and the courts.

I believe that the fear of what will happen on 9th November is groundless. I would like to give a warning, particularly in view of the numerous rumours, that an attempt at disturbance may be behind this fear. Generally speaking, we are progressing every day and life is gradually returning to normal. It has not returned to normal 100 per cent but it is proceeding rapidly in that direction...

[Question:] What is the Government's attitude on the Militia forces?

[Answer:] According to present arrangements, the Militia will be given official identity cards issued in accordance with the law. The Militia will be allowed to keep their personal firearms at their homes and will be subject to all laws and regulations in force.

[Question:] Your Excellency, I have a question concerning the past. Many criticise you because you were an officer in the British Army despite the fact that many Arab officers were with you in that army during the second world war, including Wajih al-Madani, the former Commander of the Palestine Liberation Army, who, I think, is now a colonel in the Kuwaiti Army. Why are you the only one so criticised and what was the reason for joining the British Army?



[Answer:] My answer to this completes the question raised by our brother here. When I joined the British Army in 1941 there were no Arab armies. Second, I belonged to a political organisation which believed that we should acquire military training in any army we could join. Some of my comrades in that organisation are still active in the political field. I would like these people to say something rather than that I should mention their names. However, I tried to join the [Jordanian] Arab Army at that time but Glubb refused me, so I enlisted as a soldier in the Palestine battalion of the British Army in Palestine. Then I enrolled in the cadet school. I do not think I have made a better decision than this in my life, although I did not make this decision personally, but in accordance with a recommendation by a political organisation to which I belonged. I do not wish to praise myself, but this decision made me a soldier and enabled me to fight in the first Palestine war. It also gave me a military training of which I am proud and which helps me in many things...

[Question:] International news agencies have quoted Jordanian sources as saying that the Iraqi Army has begun to withdraw from Jordan. These rumours say that the Jordanian Government has asked for the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army following the dissolution of the eastern front. What does Your Excellency think of this?

[Answer:] This is not true.

[Question:] [Indistinct, referring to Jordanians and Syrians.]

[Answer:] Yes, there is a programme. Plainly speaking, regardless of our views concerning each other [Jordanians and Syrians], these temporary differences should be no reason for dispute at all. Moreover, we belong to the same front. They need us and we need them. The fact is that our political views are not in harmony but our views are the same on the Palestine problem and the question of liberation. Our views are the same with the exception of the view that our battle is a matter of destiny and of common fate. We see eye to eye on the fact that we are facing a common enemy who is aiming at all of us. For this reason I believe there will be no problem between us because we need one another. We must co-ordinate, work with, and understand one another. We must also put aside all our conflicts for some other time. They may be right or we may be right, but this is a matter of theory and dialectic. What is certain is that we both stand on the same front in the face of a common enemy aiming at both of us.

[Question:] After the June defeat you made statements in the press and in lectures calling for support of fida'i action and for a popular liberation war. Later you were accused of making these statements only for the sake of outdoing others. Has your attitude changed since you came to office?

[Answer:] Preparation for the battle and my idea of war with Zionism are the same. As a State we move politically with sisterly Egypt as regards the outcome of the June war but not as regards the essence of the Palestine problem. On the understanding that political action is an extension of military action and vice versa, there is no contradiction. The important thing is that no action is directly opposed to our basic beliefs and the aims of such beliefs. In other words, strength and its development, according to this conviction, is the touchstone for the success of any political action. This has not changed. Of course, as a State or as a group of States, including the sisterly UAR and others, we cannot close the door in the face of political solutions. My personal view, as is clearly reflected in our press reports, is that what in the final analysis would give weight to political action is not a declaration that one is going to make a political move but rather the determination and readiness to impose a solution either by political means or by military means.

[Question:] You again differentiate between the outcome of the June defeat and the Palestine problem. Why?



[Answer:] There is no doubt that this is correct. This is evident in the acceptance by the UAR and Jordan of the Rogers plan. It is evident that, from our point of view, we are dealing with the outcome of the June defeat through this plan. As for the Palestine problem, it is still the same, and in accepting the plan both countries expressed reservations regarding the Palestinian people's right to determine this question...

[Question:] Libya and Kuwait have discontinued aid to Jordan following the dissension. Do you expect any change in their attitude and is there [sentence interrupted by Premier's answer].

[Answer:] I think Kuwait, which has not actually discontinued aid but only suspended it, is about to resume its aid. I believe we will succeed in conducting fruitful contacts with our sister Libya, so that the aid will be restored as before...

#### Ibrahim Bakr's Statement on Jordan

(a) Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 10.18 GMT 8.11.70

Text of report:

Amman: The official spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation Central Committee, Ibrahim Bakr, has stated to the paper 'Al-Fatah' that all the rumours about an imminent clash between the Resistance and the Jordanian Army are circulated by quarters hostile to the people, the homeland, the fida'iyyin and the Army. The rumours are aimed at creating a crisis and tension and, as a consequence, renewed fighting.

He said these rumours had begun to worry a number of compatriots, particularly in Amman. This had had a double subversive effect: on the one hand the rumours had prevented the return of many who had left Amman for abroad, and on the other hand they had persuaded other citizens to leave Amman to take refuge in towns and villages in the East Bank.

He added that the Cairo and Amman agreements had made considerable strides towards full implementation. However, he said the authorities were continuing to commit numerous violations of the two agreements, especially with regard to the continuing situation in Zarqa and the continued holding of detainees.

Asked his opinion of the Amman protocol, which takes effect tomorrow, regulating relations between the Palestine revolution and the State, and about the widely circulated rumours of a possible explosion of the situation tomorrow, he said this protocol added nothing new to the framework of the two agreements of Cairo and Amman. With effect from tomorrow the offices of the Central Committee, the Revolution Command, the Liberation Army and the military police were to be re-organised; fida'i identity cards carried; fida'i vehicles renumbered; and all the mistakes committed in the past were to be avoided.

It is noteworthy that several fida'i organisations - including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Sa'iqah organisation, and the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - have previously rejected the protocol and refused to abide by its provisions.

(b) Amman home service in Arabic 19.00 GMT 8.11.70

Text of report:

The representative of the Palestine Liberation Organisation Central Committee, Ibrahim Bakr, has denounced rumours that a (?confrontation) will occur between the Jordanian armed forces and the fida'iyyin either tomorrow or later this month. He regretted the circulation of such rumours which could influence a number of compatriots who had left Amman for abroad or for towns and villages in the country.



He added that the implementation of the Cairo and Amman agreements would begin tomorrow. He added that a date had been fixed to distribute identity cards for the fida'iyin and to organise and renumber their vehicles and to issue entry and exit permits in accordance with the Amman agreement.

Bakr said that the Central Committee had begun to implement all these measures. He said the maintenance of public security under civil administration in accordance with the Cairo agreement was a normal procedure to which we did not object. Such action should not be the source for rumours.

Bakr indicated that the absence of fida'i bases in Amman in particular, and the absence of armed fida'iyin in Amman streets was also a normal measure to which we did not object.

He said the Central Committee had not been forced to adopt this measure nor had the measure been imposed on it. On the contrary, it had been the central committee which had proposed the Amman draft agreement to the supreme Arab follow-up committee. He said that, in its proposal, the Central Committee had been careful to maintain the prestige of fida'i action, to avoid all the mistakes which had become evident from past experience such as carrying arms in the streets and the unjustifiably numerous offices, to care for the security of the citizen and his property whether civilian or military, and to define the fida'i rights and duties.

He stressed that the Central Committee was anxious to complete the implementation of the measures not yet fully implemented in the agreements concluded between the two sides. He said this would enable the fida'i action to devote itself to its objectives, namely to fight the Zionist enemy for the liberation of Palestine. Bakr concluded that the fida'i action had actually resumed its military activities in the occupied territory, as was shown by the operations recently announced. The stronger the revolution's security, the greater would be its fighting efficiency against the Zionist enemy.

#### Statements by Yasir Arafat

(a) Baghdad "Voice of the Palestine Liberation" in Arabic 17.00 GMT 7.11.70

Text of report of Algerian 'Revolution Africaine' interview with Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Revolution Central Committee:

In an interview published by the weekly paper 'Revolution Africaine' in Algeria today, brother Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Revolution Central Committee, said: US experts commanded the operations against the fida'iyin in Jordan last September, and they are still in their posts today. We have proof that those who commanded the operations were US experts and that they are still there.

Arafat continued: It is clear that the one running the operations was not the C-in-C of the Jordanian forces Habis al-Majali. I know the number of the communiques issued [sic]. They were issued in his name. This is a fact. F-M Majali heard them on the radio like everybody else. Brother Yasir Arafat told the weekly paper that the US Ambassador, the US military advisers, and the US civilians in Amman participated in preparing the operations.

Brother Yasir Arafat quoted King Husayn as having said at the peace talks in Cairo later that Jordanian Intelligence had believed that it would be possible to eliminate the Palestine revolution within three hours.






BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

13 November 1970

(1/1)



Enter in 16/4  
per 17/4

Dear Christopher,

430

Please refer to our telegrams 867 and 869 of 4 November, concerning the shooting incidents in Amman of the day before. You might like to have for the record the enclosed copy of the statement put out by the Arab Higher Committee on the results of its investigations. It seems to blame both sides about equally - the fedayeen for carrying arms contrary to the Amman agreement, and the security forces for the over-reaction of a number of its members.

Yours sincerely,  
*C.P. Carter*  
(C.P. Carter)

C.W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

Copy to:

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- 2 -

carrying out its obligations under the Amman agreement and its protocol. Its specific complaints, presented to the Arab Higher Committee on 10 November, were that detainees were still being held at al-Jafr and elsewhere and that reports indicate that some are being tortured, that the state of emergency had not been lifted in Zerqa and the Central Committee had not been able to open an office there, that no arrangements had been made for PASC military police to exercise their functions in Zerqa and certain southern towns, that labour permits and Jordanian passports had not been returned to Gaza citizens resident on the East Bank and that a number of Government officials (presumably fedayeen supporters) had been sacked. "Fatah" newspaper has accused the Government of procrastination, and has warned that "the revolution will not be the only party adhering to the agreement". The Government has not yet replied publicly to these charges.

*Yours sincerely,*

*C. P. Carter*

(C.P. Carter)

Copy to:

Chanceries,

Beirut.

Cairo

Tel Aviv

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Fateh - 5 November 1970

The Arab higher committee issued a statement on the incidents which took place on Tuesday. The statement said:

Sad incidents broke out on Tuesday evening (3.11.1970), claiming the lives of a number of soldiers, security guard, commandos and innocent civilians. According to preliminary investigations, the reasons for these incidents are to be found in the exchange of fire between a military police patrol and a group of civilians carrying arms in a civilian vehicle. This sparked off intermittent firing in various and outlying parts of Amman for several hours.

Since an inquiry into the causes of these incidents was still in progress, the suspension of a member of the security force in whose case there was evidence to prove his participation in an operation of killing during the incidents took place yesterday evening. Instructions were given to the competent departments, requiring them to look for those responsible for killing two soldiers, whose bodies were found on Jebal Hussein away from the scene of the incidents, and to bring them to trial, together with anyone found guilty of participation in acts of killing, before the judicial authority.

Three security guards were suspended and sent to prison yesterday for misbehaviour towards officers of the Arab military observation committee.

The higher committee deeply regrets the fall of more lives. All concerned had hoped that those lives would fall in the field of honour and not without a useful purpose. It regrets that some people do not realize the dangerous phase through which Arab causes are passing in the present circumstances and the need to forget the past, to take things seriously and to end ill will and the causes of division.

It condemns the violation of confirmed agreements by the carrying of arms in an entirely unlawful manner and also rashness in the use of arms without thought of the consequences.

The Arab higher committee appeals to all those who carry arms to fear God, to take into account the feelings of citizens and the interests of the homeland and not to use arms as a means of destruction and corruption and of filling with despair a people which suffers as a result of difficult circumstances and is tired of the life of fear and intimidation.

The committee hopes that all will heed this appeal so that it can discharge its mission in an atmosphere, enabling it to continue its efforts and ensuring to citizens tranquillity and stability.



CONFIDENTIAL

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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
AMMAN.

13 November 1970

- (i) ~~Mr Evans~~  
(ii) ~~copy~~ Research D. RUS. done %  
(iii) ~~etc~~

19/11

Dear Christopher,

Jordan Internal

It has been a fairly encouraging week. Two minor clashes near Souf in Irbid Governate were reported, but no casualties seem to have resulted. The chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, Bahi Al-Adgham, has been visiting Cairo, Jedda and Beirut, making satisfied noises about the situation in Jordan and the achievements of his committee. The chairman of the Military Observer Committee, Brig. Hilmi, on 11 November reportedly described the situation in Amman as "excellent".

4/17 2. There was some fear that tension would rise on 9 November, as this was the date upon which the fortnight's transitional period laid down in the protocol to the Amman agreement expired (our tel 836 of 26 October) and when the security forces would start to exercise their full powers according to law. 9 November passed without incident, a fact which must in large part be ascribed to the efforts of the Prime Minister, Wasfi Tell and of "Fatah" newspaper to keep the temperature down. On the two days preceeding 9 November, editorials in the paper warned citizens against rumours being spread by agents with the aim of creating trouble. On 8 November, the paper published a statement by the Central Committee's official spokesman, Ibrahim Bakr, in which he explained the aims and content of the protocol to the Amman agreement. He said that the assumption by the public security authorities of their powers under the civil administration is a "natural measure to which there is no objection", as was the absence of fedayeen bases in Amman and the prohibition on fedayeen touring the capital with their arms. He emphasised that these measures had not been imposed on the Central Committee, which was determined to avoid the mistakes of the past such as the carrying of arms in the streets and the existence of an excessive number of fedayeen offices. Other preparations for the full implementation of the Amman agreement and protocol seem to have gone ahead smoothly. Armed fedayeen are reported to have left Amman and Irbid on 7 November, the Central Committee has opened its offices in Amman (which "Fatah" emphasised replace the offices of individual organisations that had existed previously), and has issued the appropriate identity cards and permits to its followers.

3. The less rosy side of things is the consistent complaint being made by the Central Committee that the Government is not

C.W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

/carrying

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PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO FOH 170925Z

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170925Z

TO MOD DI4

NOVEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 170925Z NOV 70 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FCO CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV BEIRUT HQBFNE JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITUATION AS AT 170900Z.

pr  
19/4

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY  
NET 1/4

1. OFFICIAL JORDANIAN ARMY SPOKESMAN GAVE FOLLOWING ACCOUNTS OF INCIDENTS IN JORDAN DURING LAST 24 HOURS.

2. IRBID.

IN EARLY MORNING 16 NOV PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES (POLICE) FOUND FRUIT AND VEGETABLE SELLERS CARTS OBSTRUCTING A MAIN STREET. THEY COLLECTED THESE TRADESMEN TOGETHER AND TOOK THEM TO THE PUBLIC SECURITY DIRECTORATE SO THAT THEY COULD ALL BE INFORMED AS TO THE AREAS IN WHICH THEY COULD TRADE. AT 0830 HOURS FEDAYEEN FIRED FROM ROOFS NEAR BY AT THE DIRECTORATE AND POLICE PATROLS IN THE AREA DURING HEAVY FIRING TWO POLICEMEN WERE KILLED. FIRING LASTED UNTIL 1400 HOURS BUT BROKE OUT AGAIN AT 1415 UNTIL 1530 HOURS UNTIL STOPPED UNDER ARRANGEMENT OF THE ARAB HIGHER FOLLOWUP COMMITTEE AT 1945 HOURS A HANDGRENADE WAS THROWN AT ANOTHER POLICE STATION IN IRBID ACCOMPANIED BY MACHINE GUN FIRE, WHICH DAMAGED HOUSES IN THE AREA. AT 2000 HOURS THE ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY DISTRICT OFFICE BUILDING, AND THE MAIN POST OFFICE CAME UNDER FIRE UNTIL ABOUT 2030 HOURS. TOTAL CASUALTIES IN IRBID ARE REPORTED AS 3 POLICE KILLED, 4 CIVILIANS KILLED, 2 POLICE WOUNDED AND 43 CIVILIANS WOUNDED.

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3. IN ANSWER TO DA'S QUESTIONS SPOKESMAN SAID IRBID WAS QUIET TODAY AND THAT THE ARMY HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN THESE CLASHES. HE WAS NOT SURE WHAT FEDAYEEN GROUP WAS INVOLVED BUT THOUGHT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN AN EXTREME LEFT WING GROUP.

4. KHIRBET ASFUR (YA 7380).

AT 0910 HOURS 16 NOV A MILITARY PATROL WAS FIRED ON BY FEDAYEEN IN POSITIONS IN THIS AREA NORTH OF JERASH. THE ENGAGEMENT LASTED UNTIL 1430 HOURS CASUALTIES REPORTED ARE 3 SOLDIERS KILLED, 2 CIVILIANS KILLED, 4 SOLDIERS WOUNDED AND 22 CIVILIANS WOUNDED.

5. COMMENT.

SPOKESMAN GAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS INCIDENT WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE CAUSED HEAVY CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. HE SAID THAT FEDAYEEN CASUALTIES WERE NOT KNOWN AND THAT CASUALTY FIGURES DID NOT INCLUDE FEDAYEEN. WE HAVE HAD ANOTHER REPORT DURING THE PAST WEEK OF A CLASH IN THIS AREA.

6. AMMAN.

FIRING WAS HEARD IN AMMAN OVER A PERIOD OF 20 MINUTES LAST NIGHT. OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN SAID THAT FEDAYEEN OPENED FIRE WITH MACHINE GUNS AND AN RPG AT A POLICE VEHICLE. NO CASUALTIES ARE REPORTED.

7. COMMENT.

SOME SHOTS WERE ALSO HEARD FROM THE AREA OF JEBEL HUSSEIN AND THE ITALIAN HOSPITAL. LIFE IN AMMAN IS ENTIRELY NORMAL THIS MORNING.

DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE TO HQBFNE JIS(NE) AND JISGULF AND PRIORITY TO MOD D14

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN.

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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(442)

IN CLAIR  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 907

TO F.C.O.  
17 NOVEMBER 1970

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17 NOV 1970

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171215Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 907 DATED 17 NOVEMBER 1970 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD JIS(NE) AND  
MOD DI4

per am  
12/4

JORDAN CLASHES.

(441)

THE FEDAYEEN VERSION OF THE CLASHES REPORTED IN MY DA'S TELNO  
FOH 170925Z APPEARED IN FATAH NEWSPAPER.

IT CLAIMS THAT THE CLASHES BEGAN WHEN PUBLIC SECURITY PATROLS  
ARRESTED AND BEAT CITIZENS AND SEARCHED HOUSES IN IRBID.

THE PATROLS OCCUPIED A NUMBER OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND SET UP MACHINE  
GUNS ON THE ROOFS. THE ARAB OBSERVATION COMMITTEE TRIED TO STOP  
THE FIGHTING, BUT OFFICERS CLAIMED THAT THEIR MEN WERE OUT OF  
CONTROL. OTHER CLASHES WERE REPORTED AT JERASH, SOUF REFUGEE CAMP  
(6KM N.W. OF JERASH) KAHR ASFOUR AND SAKAB.

THE PAPER CLAIMS THAT THE CLASHES HAD FOLLOWED ATTACKS BY MEMBERS  
OF THE "JORDANIAN POPULAR RESISTANCE" UPON FEDAYEEN AND WEST  
BANKERS, DURING THE PAST WEEK.

DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE TO JIS(NE) AND MODDI4

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against the fedayeen (advocated by the Israelis and others) has failed to solve the problem. The Israelis appear to see Hussain as having been successful and to argue that they will not accept in the future any claim that he is too weak to deal with the fedayeen. This is a misappreciation.

B Four Power Talks

4. The Americans may well wish to discuss the future of the talks more fully than the FCO Briefs provide for.

The U.S. view is, in essence,

(i) That the deputies meeting, should end because the Russians have made their success impossible.

(ii) That the principals could continue to meet, but that there is no question of their sending guidelines to Jarring.

(iii) That the "only" way of getting progress is by the Israelis and the Egyptians involved in discussions under Jarring.

(iv) That ~~no~~ progress by Jarring is possible until the violations of the standstill have been undone.

5. This view is open to the following criticisms:

(i) There never has been a link between Jarring and a ceasefire/standstill. Such a link was not even thought essential to the Rogers plan by the Americans themselves.

(ii) There is no reason, apart from American hostility to the idea, why the four should not send guidelines to Jarring now or at any other time. The four are not tied

/eternally

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


eternally to the procedures in the Rogers plan.

(iii) The deputies' inability to make progress in drafting their report is as much due to American as to Soviet obstruction. The same is true of the principals. For example, the Americans have never commented in detail on the Soviet proposals on commitments to peace made in June.

6. The American view of the talks derives essentially from their acceptance of the Israeli approach to negotiations and, in particular, from their insistence on "preagreement" between the parties before Jarring's work begins. We do not accept this view. Nor is it in our interest to acquiesce in winding up the talks which enable us to satisfy (at very low cost in terms of our relations with anybody) Arab demands of us to be "active" in pursuing Resolution 242 and our need not to seem to be wholly subordinate to the Americans. We cannot say this to the Americans. What we should say to them is

- (i) Their plan is not the only avenue to a settlement.
- (ii) The four power talks are a valid alternative, which should not be discarded simply in deference to Israel. (We must try to persuade the Americans of this).
- (iii) If the Rogers plan fails, what do the U.S. Government propose to do? Give up the search for a settlement as hopeless? Can we afford that, rather than try the four power method?

  
(J.P. Tripp)

Near Eastern Department

2 October, 1970

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(443)

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original or R.E.  
NEM 3/204/1.

Miss Beckett  
Mr. Long  
Kne. a pc.

17/11

pr

21/11

Sir  
ams 26

Middle East

The following notes may be helpful to you

A Prospects for Jordan and King Hussain's regime

1. Negative factors

Neither side has won a clear-cut victory. The many casualties have brought the King great odium, among Palestinians in Jordan and elsewhere, and with Arab governments. The Khartoum payments, essential to his economic survival, are in doubt. President Nasser's sudden death removes a further prop. The Syrians and the Iraqis are more hostile than ever. The country is divided, with the Irbid area under effective fedayeen control. Hussain's right-wing advisers are discredited and no viable, competent government is in sight.

2. Positive factors

Once again Hussain has stayed on his feet in a very tricky situation. The fedayeen have suffered very severely. Stocks of ammunition and other equipment have been much reduced by the fighting. Both super-powers tried to exercise some restraint on outside intervention. The hostages were successfully extricated.

3. Summary

It is too early to make any worthwhile political judgment on the Middle East so soon after Nasser's death. But Hussain's position is as precarious as ever. The "big stick" policy  
/against



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- 2 -

4. DA HAS TOURED RAS EL AIN AREA AND SOUK THIS MORNING.  
BUSINESS IS BRISK, SHOPS ARE OPEN AND LIFE NORMAL.  
NOT AN ARMED FEDAYEEN WAS SEEN. SUBSEQUENT TOUR OF ROUGHLY THE  
SAME AREAS BY AMBASSADOR CONFIRMS ALTHOUGH IMPRESSION WAS OF RATHER  
FEWER PEOPLE ABOUT THAN NORMAL EVEN FOR RAMADHAN

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 AND ROUTINE TO HQBFNE JIS(NE)  
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CYPHER CAT/A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 190825Z

TO MOD (U.K.)  
NOVEMBER 1970



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190825Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO 190825Z NOV 70 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FCO BAGHDAD CAIRO TEL AVIV BEIRUT HQBFNE JIS(NE) JISGULF

SITUATION IN AMMAN AS AT 190800Z

1. NIGHT 18/19 NOVEMBER WAS THE NOISIEST WE HAVE HAD FOR SOME TIME WITH INTERMITTENT MOSTLY SMALL-ARMS FIRING CONTINUING FROM 1930 HOURS 18 NOVEMBER UNTIL FIRST LIGHT TODAY. MOST OF THE FIRING SOUNDED AS IF IT WAS ORIGINATED BY FEDAYEEN WEAPONS AND GOVERNMENT FORCES REACTIONS SOUNDED MINIMAL.
2. OFFICIAL ARMY SPOKESMAN STATES THAT AT 1930 HOURS FEDAYEEN ATTACKED SECURITY POLICE LOCATIONS IN THE RAS EL AIN (CENTRAL SOUK) AREA. FIRE WAS RETURNED BY THE GUARDS ATTACKED. THEN FEDAYEEN STARTED TO FIRE FROM JEBEL AKHDAR, ASHRAFIEY, AND AREAS SOUTH AND EAST OF JEBEL AMMAN BUT NOT AS FAR EAST AS JEBEL JAUF. NO CASUALTIES ARE REPORTED.

COMMENT:

THIS, IN VIEW OF VOLUME OF FIRE HEARD, WOULD BE REMARKABLE ANYWHERE ELSE.

3. P.L.O. HAVE PUT OUT NO STATEMENT AS YET.

/4. DA

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-2-

4. THE MODERATE TONE OF THE STATEMENT, THE BLAME THAT IT LAYS UPON THE FEDAYEEN FOR THE JERASH CLASHES, THE CITING OF THE REPORT OF THE ARAB MILITARY OBSERVER COMMITTEE ON THE INCIDENTS IN IRBID, AND THE FACT THAT THE STATEMENT WAS ISSUED FOLLOWING MEETINGS WITH THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE AND THE GOVERNMENT ALL SUGGEST THAT IT REPRESENTS SOME SORT OF CONSENSUS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS TO WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED.

DEFCOMCEN PASS ROUTINE TO MOD DI4 JIS(NE) ANDHQBFNE AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO DEFCOMCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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MPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL.NO. 916

20 NOVEMBER 1970

RESTRICTED 200915Z

23/11

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 916 DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, MOD DI4, JI(NE), HQBFNE JIS(GULF), AND BAGHDAD.

MEETINGS WERE HELD YESTERDAY BETWEEN THE FEDAYEEN CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE. FOLLOWING THESE, A CENTRAL COMMITTEE SPOKESMAN ISSUED A STATEMENT ON THE CLASHES OF 15, 16, 17 AND 18 NOVEMBER. IT BLAMES THE CLASHES NEAR JERASH ON 15 AND 16 NOVEMBER ON FEDAYEEN WHO FIRED ON AN ARMY PATROL, AND SAYS THAT ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED FOR THE ARREST OF FIVE FEDAYEEN WHO REFUSED TO STOP FIRING WHEN ORDERED TO DO SO. CASUALTIES IN THE JERASH AREA ARE GIVEN AS FOUR KILLED AND 11 WOUNDED, AND A TAXI AND A JAA VEHICLE WERE DESTROYED.

2. ON THE INCIDENTS IN IRBID ON 15 AND 16 NOVEMBER, THE STATEMENT QUOTES A REPORT BY THE ARAB MILITARY OBSERVER COMMITTEE (WHICH WE HAVE NOT SEEN) AS SAYING THAT IT IS NOT KNOWN WHO STARTED THE FIRING ON THE 15TH, BUT THAT THE SECURITY FORCES PROVOKED THAT ON THE 16TH. DESPITE GREAT EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 2ND DIVISION AND ARAB MILITARY OBSERVERS TO STOP THE FIRING, IT CONTINUED FOR NINE HOURS. DURING THESE TWO DAYS, 14 PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND 63 WOUNDED, AND TWO PASC VEHICLES WERE DESTROYED.

3. THE STATEMENT SAYS THAT INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE FIRING IN AMMAN ON THE NIGHT OF 18 AND 19 NOVEMBER (MY DA'S TEL 190825Z) ARE STILL CONTINUING. A PLO OFFICIAL HAS CONFIRMED TO A MEMBER OF MY STAFF THAT NO CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED.

/4. THE MODERATE

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- 2 -

fedayeen charges, and on the issue of the dismissal of officers and civil servants with suspected fedayeen sympathies appears to be unrepentent; for on 12 November the Official Gazette published the "Military Administration (Officials of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) Rules, 1970". These permit the Military Governor General to dismiss without right of appeal "any official if he is convinced that the official concerned indulges in activity prejudicial to the internal or external security of the State, to its constitution or to its regime". This incidentally, would seem to be a contravention of the Amman agreement if it is used to victimise fedayeen sympathisers.

*Yours sincerely,*

*C. P. Carter*

(C.P. Carter)

Copy to:

Chanceries,  
Beirut.  
Cairo.  
Tel Aviv.

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U361 20/11

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(i) Mr Evans R.E.

(ii) Mr Eggar 21/11

(iii) City Res B, PUJD  
done 23/11

(iv) Krtk



BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

17 November 1970

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29h

Dear Christopher,

Jordan Government and the Fedayeen

439

Please refer to my letter 1/1 of 13 November. Fedayeen attacks on the Government for allegedly breaking the Amman and Cairo agreements have continued, and with yesterday's clashes in the Jerash area, have led to a deterioration in the relations between the two sides, though how serious this is it is still too early to say. An article in "Fatah" newspaper of 14 November accused the Government of:-

- (a) Delaying the release of the remaining detainees, particularly "Arab volunteers", and of continuing arrests.
- (b) Pretending not to notice the actions of members of the popular resistance hostile to fedayeen action. Members of the popular resistance hinder the return of the fedayeen to their bases and, in many cases, open fire on them.
- (c) Failing to end the emergency military situation in Zerqa.
- (d) Taking action against army and public security officers and civil servants because of their sympathy for the fedayeen.
- (d) Allowing the army to occupy certain buildings in Amman (presumably in strategic positions).

1. hdn't heard  
of these.  
(see below)

2. The Government has replied saying that the remaining detainees were either arrested for crimes committed before the September fighting or are foreigners who have broken Jordanian residence laws. The "Fatah" reference to "Arab volunteers" concedes the second point, but on 16 November the paper returned to the charge by stating that the Cairo and Amman agreements permit the "entry of volunteers joining fedayeen action". The two agreements do not, in fact, specifically allow the fedayeen to import armed men, and the Government is unlikely to be impressed by the fedayeen argument.

3. "Fatah's" point (b) above is interesting, as it seems to confirm reports that minor dust-ups have occurred in villages between fedayeen who have moved out of the towns in accordance with the Cairo and Amman agreements and (government armed) villagers ("members of the popular resistance") who resent the invasion.

4. The Government has not replied specifically to the other

/fedayeen

C.W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

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PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 231135Z

TO MOD (U.K.)

NOVEMBER 1970

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231135Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO 231135Z NOV 70 REPEATED FOR INFORM.  
TO FCO BAGHDAD BEIRUT TEL AVIV CAIRO HQBFNE JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

1. SEVERAL SHOTS AND TWO EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD LAST NIGHT. THE SECOND EXPLOSION TOOK PLACE AT ABOUT 2215 HOURS.
2. THIS MORNING, ALTHOUGH THE ARMY OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN HAS NOT MADE A STATEMENT, WE ARE INFORMED BY HIM THAT THE ARAB HIGHER FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE HAS DONE SO. THE STATEMENT SAYS THAT ONE SERGEANT OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES HAS BEEN KILLED IN THE JEBEL NUSHA AREA OF AMMAN (NEAR JEBEL HUSSEIN). IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THREE FEDAYEEN WERE INVOLVED. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS NOW TAKING ACTION TO FIND THE MURDERERS AND TO HAND THEM OVER TO THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES.
3. A MEMBER OF THE EMBASSY WHO TRAVELLED THROUGH AMMAN TOWN CENTRE FOUR TIMES BETWEEN 1800 AND 2200 HOURS LAST NIGHT REPORTS THAT THOUGH FEW PEOPLE WERE ABOUT SOME TRAFFIC WAS MOVING AND PEDESTRIANS INCLUDING WOMEN WERE ON THE STREETS. SINGLE POLICEMEN COULD BE SEEN QUIETLY PACING THEIR BEATS. POLICE OFFICERS WERE SEEN WITH THEIR MEN IN SEVERAL PLACES. THERE WAS NO SIGN OF ANY UNTOWARD ACTIVITY.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 AND ROUTINE TO HQBFNE JIS NE  
AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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Near Eastern Department.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

(NEJ 1/4)

25 November, 1970

Pr  
29/11

Jordan Government and the Fedayeen

Very many thanks for your letter 1/1 of 17 November.

2. I was interested by the references in paragraphs 1(b) and 3 to "members of the popular resistance". I had not heard before of this body. You say they are "(government armed) villagers .... who resent the invasion" (of fedayeen into towns in Jordan). I assume they are East Bankers, and that their movement represents a rec~~o~~descence of the old East Bank/West Bank rivalry. If so, the effect of such a movement (and of the government's stimulating it) could be most damaging to the (small) degree of natural unity that may still survive in Jordan after the recent civil war. Understandable though this sort of movement may be among a population which has recently suffered so seriously from disturbances ultimately attributable to fedayeen action, I should have thought that it could only backfire. What do you think? It would be interesting to hear more of how numerous this "popular resistance" is and how far the government is helping it.

(C.W. Long)

C.P. Carter, Esq.,  
AMMAN

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- 2 -

3. P.L.O. CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

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AT 0725 HOURS 25 NOVEMBER JORDANIAN ARMY OPENED FIRE WITH ARTILLERY ON ONE OF OUR POSITIONS NEAR KHIRBAT ASFUR. MORTAR AND MACHINE GUN FIRE COVERED THE ADVANCE OF UNITS. 1015 HRS SOME TANKS FROM THE IRBID AREA MOVED TOWARDS JERASH. 1325 HOURS THE ARMY MOVED PATROLS FROM AJLUN TO JERASH AND OPENED FIRE ON OUR COMMANDOS. FIRE WAS RETURNED. TWO LANDROVERS MOUNTING 106 MM RECOILLESS ANTI-TANK WEAPONS WERE CAPTURED. THESE OPERATIONS ARE A VIOLATION OF THE TREATIES OF CAIRO AND AMMAN. THE POSITIONS ATTACKED WERE OCCUPIED BY THE FORCES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PLO. NONE OF THE LEADERS OF FATEH HAVE CONTACTED ANY ARMY LEADERS. SUCH CONTACT SHOULD BE ARRANGED THROUGH THE COMMAND OF THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN THE AREA.

4. COMMENT.

-----

DA HAPPENED TO BE IN NORTH JORDAN DURING NIGHT 24/25 NOVEMBER AND HEARD FIRING IN THE DIRECTION OF JERASH. OPERATION WAS PLANNED BY 40 ARMED BDE COMMANDER. SOME TANKS WERE IN SUPPORT BUT IT IS NOT KNOWN IF THEY WERE USED. DURING MORNING 25 NOVEMBER JORDANIAN OFFICERS IN THE AREA SAID THEY THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN SOME CASUALTIES. MAIN ROAD JERASH TO FRONTIER WAS CLOSED UNTIL EARLY AFTERNOON.

THIS ACTION SHOWS DETERMINATION OF GOVERNMENT TO ENFORCE LAW AND ORDER. IT IS INTERESTING THAT THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT EMPHASISES THE COOPERATION BETWEEN FATEH AND THE ARMY.

DEFCOMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 AND ROUTINE TO HQBFNE AND JISNE AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCOMCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[ SENT TO D.C.C. ]

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PRIORITY AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

PRIORITY AMMAN TELNO FOH 261135Z TO MODUK

NOVEMBER 1970

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261135Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 261135Z NOV 70 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO FCO BEIRUT BAGHDAD CAIRO TEL AVIV HQBFNE JIS(NE) AND  
JIS GULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

1. INCIDENT NORTH OF JERASH ON 25 NOVEMBER. FOLLOWING ARE TWO  
VERSIONS RECEIVED.

2. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION.

YESTERDAY MORNING (25) NOVEMBER THE ARMY TOOK  
ACTION TO REMOVE FEDAYEEN FROM THE AREA OF KHIRBAT ASFUR  
(YA7380) SOME 5 KILOMETERS NORTH OF JERASH. THIS ACTION HAD BEEN  
AGREED WITH FEDAYEEN OFFICERS AFTER THE FEDAYEEN ORGANISATION HAD  
FAILED TO ARRANGE FOR THE EVACUATION OF FEDAYEEN FROM THIS AREA.  
AN EXCHANGE OF FIRE FROM LIGHT WEAPONS BROKE OUT BETWEEN THE JORDAN  
ARMY AND THE DISOBEDIENT FEDAYEEN. NO CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED  
AND THE ARMY NOW OCCUPIES THE AREA. FEDAYEEN OPENED FIRE FROM THIS  
AREA ON 15 NOVEMBER AND DISOBEYED SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY  
FEDAYEEN OFFICERS AND THE ARAB HIGHER FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE.  
AS CIVILIAN TRAFFIC ON THE MAIN JERASH Irbid ROAD WAS  
ENDANGERED THE MILITARY LEADERS OF 2 DIVISION AND AL FATAH AGREED  
TO ACTION BEING TAKEN TO EVACUATE THE FEDAYEEN BY 23 NOVEMBER.  
THE EVACUATION WAS NOT ARRANGED AND AN EXTENSION OF 24 HOURS WAS  
GIVEN. AS THE MILITARY LEADERS OF AL FATAH WERE STILL NOT ABLE TO  
ARRANGE THE EVACUATION THE ARMY WAS ORDERED TO DO SO.

/3. P.L.O.

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"Fatah" 23 November

My Country - My Country

The date - a day in Black September.

The bombs and the ashes were falling upon the city. Death descended upon the streets, spreading its great wings. But the burning anger, the great bravery, the blood running like a spear - all these bloody pictures are the true background to this people, and its interpretative face.

In one of the shelters in Amman, the cries of the children were mixed with the roar of bombs, and the appeals of the women with the whine of the shrapnel, when one of the young men stopped to cry out

"My country ..... my country ..... my country."

And voices were raised in a fiery anthem; the shelter echoed with the song; the shells were heard no more; fear became something that belonged merely to a grave or a museum. We joined in the songs - women and children. The voices increased in intensity whenever news came of the progress of the battle.

I allowed myself..... to weep.

A people answered death and the bombs - with songs, with defiance, with bravery - a people in which a man grows, because he feels he belongs to this people - this people which does not die.



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- 2 -

--- 4. Finally, for local colour, I enclose the translation of a semi-poetic piece that appeared in "Fatah" last week. For all its ghastliness (not all of which is attributable to the translation), it is a good illustration of the way that "Black September" is entering the mythology of the Palestinian people, and taking a place there alongside the Battle of Karamah.

*Yours sincerely,*

*C.P. Carter*  
(C.P. Carter)


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Tel Aviv

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

26 November 1970

(1/1)

(i) Mrs Baskett

Mr Long 2/12

Dear Christopher, (ii) Enter & etc, Re. D, PUSD

Government-Fedayeen Relations

(446)

Some of the points at issue between the Government and the fedayeen mentioned in my letter 1/1 of 20 November seem to have been settled; certainly the alleged government violations of the Cairo and Amman agreements have figured less prominently in fedayeen propaganda during the past week. "Fatah" of 21 November reported that agreement had been reached on the withdrawal of the army from Zerqa and the release of detainees (the "Arab Volunteers" would be returned to their own countries, mainly Syria and Iraq). The Government would control the behaviour of the Popular Resistance Forces (the government-sponsored militia) and in return the fedayeen withdrawal from Irbid and Jerash would be completed. Both sides agreed not to launch propaganda campaigns against the other, but information machines would be permitted to criticise "incorrect actions" and agreements by the other side. "Provocative" army positions in Amman and armed fedayeen militia patrols were matters which would be investigated further.

2. A further meeting between the two sides was held on 21 November, at which a certain measure of agreement was reached on a number of other matters, e.g. misbehaviour by government forces in Amman, the kidnapping of a number of public security men by the fedayeen. However "Fatah" newspaper later in the week again criticised the Government's failure to abide by the agreements; it seems that the two sides are finding it quite easy to agree to things in committee, but that there is still much delay in implementation.

3. The "Palestinian State" has re-emerged as a major subject of fedayeen hostility during the past week. "Fatah" newspaper of 25 November asked whether the "continuation of the present tense situation" was designed to prompt the Palestinians into accepting "the so-called Palestinian state". Today's "Fatah" editorial is a long rejection of the Palestinian state and re-affirms the Revolution's objective of "liberation from the river to the sea, and from Galilee to the Negev". Our impression is that many Palestinians are in fact much exercised by this problem at the moment, and while highly suspicious of the motives of those floating the idea of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank, are nonetheless considering whether the idea might not in fact have some advantage for them.

C.W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

/4. Finally,

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CYPHER CAT/A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 040945Z

CONFIDENTIAL  
TO MOD  
DECEMBER 1970

451

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040945Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO 040945Z DEC 70 REPEATED FOR INFO  
ROUTINE TO FCO BEIRUT TEL AVIV CAIRO BAGHDAD JIS(NE) HQBFNE AND  
JIS(GULF).

SITUATION IN AMMAN AS AT 040900Z DEC.

8/12  
NET 4/4

1. DURING NIGHT 3/4 DECEMBER BETWEEN ABOUT 1915 HOURS AND 2300 HOURS WE HEARD ALMOST CONTINUOUS FIRING FROM SMALL ARMS TOGETHER WITH SOME EXPLOSIONS FROM THE AREA OF JEBELS ASHRAFIYEH, NADHIF AND JUST SOUTH OF FIRST CIRCLE ON JEBEL AMMAN.
2. THE QIADA REPORTS THAT A POLICE PATROL WAS FIRED AT ON JEBEL NADHIF AND A POLICEMAN WOUNDED. A SIMILAR INCIDENT IN WHICH ANOTHER POLICEMAN WAS WOUNDED OCCURRED NEAR WAHDAT CAMP, RPG'S WERE USED, (TWO FIRES, PRESUMABLY VEHICLES, COULD BE SEEN IN THIS AREA). QIADA CONFIRMS FIRING AS IN PARA 1 AND SAYS SOME SHOTS WERE FIRED IN THE JEBEL NUSHA (NEAR JEBEL HUSSEIN) AND RAS AL AIN AREAS, BUT THAT THIS DID NOT CAUSE ANY FURTHER INCIDENTS.
3. PLO OFFICE HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION BUT CLAIMS 12 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED OR WOUNDED.
4. THIS MORNING BUSINESS IS AS USUAL IN THE SOUK AND BOTH PLA AND GOVERNMENT SECURITY GUARDS ARE STROLLING LEISURELY AROUND. HOWEVER THERE ARE MORE CURSORY POLICE CHECKS THAN USUAL.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 ROUTINE TO JIS(NE) HQBFNE AND JIS(GULF).

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN  
MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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
455



BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

UNCLASSIFIED



4 December, 1970

Dear Department,

402

In paragraph 14 of his despatch No. (1/1) of 15 October entitled "Third Impressions, or Jordan Revisited" the Ambassador erroneously attributed to Research Department a policy paper in fact produced by Planning Staff. Since the recommendations made in that paper have provided an incentive for useful action, albeit in a civil engineering context, the Ambassador would like the credit to go to the right quarter, namely the Planning Staff, to whom he offers his apologies.

Yours ever,

Tom  
9/12

CHANCERY.

Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

Copy to: W.R. Tomkys, Esq., Planning Staff





3. The security precautions adopted for the opening were the strictest seen in Amman for some time. All traffic movement was stopped along Prince Hassan's route from the palace, and armed soldiers were seen occupying many roof tops. Prince Hassan's car was surrounded by at least eight trucks and Landrovers containing Bedu soldiers armed to the teeth. Our D.A. thinks nearly a brigade of troops was involved.

4. Both my Ambassador and the Information Officer were surprised upon leaving the Parliament building after the speech by the sound of wildly cheering crowds. Examination revealed that this was coming from a loudspeaker mounted on an army truck!

*Yours sincerely,*

*— C. P. Carter*

(C.P. Carter)



Mr Laxer 7/12

Miss Berkett

Mr M... 7/12

Enter 7/12



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
AMMAN.

450

4 December, 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

NEJ 1/4

9/12

Dear Christopher,

Jordan Parliament

Prince Hassan, acting as Regent in King Hussein's absence abroad, delivered the speech from the throne at the opening of the fourth ordinary session of the Ninth Jordanian Parliament on 2 December. His delivery was quite impressive, though he said very little at great length, his main themes being the sacrifices of Jordan's martyrs, the devotion of Jordan's armed forces and the steadfastness of the brothers on the West Bank. He re-affirmed that Jordan is part of the Arab world, and that "Palestine is Jordan and Jordan is Palestine". He condemned the idea of creating a "diminutive Palestinian state" as a plot against Jordan's unity; "we do not believe one single Arab will be misled by such a suspect idea". He re-affirmed Jordan's acceptance of Resolution 242 and of the Rogers initiative, but said that Jordan must be fully prepared (presumably for military action) in case the U.N. failed to implement its own resolutions. He praised President Bourguiba and the late President Nasser for their rôles in ending the recent fighting in Jordan, and said that Jordan welcomed the recent moves by the U.A.R., Libya, Sudan and Syria towards unity.

2. Elections for the various Parliamentary offices were held, none of which produced any surprises. The two houses will start work next week on the task of preparing their replies to the speech from the throne.

/3. The

C.W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.



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CYPHER CAT/A

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 957

TO F.C.O.

7 DECEMBER 1970

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458

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080600Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 957 DATED 7 DECEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO MOD DI4 JIS(NE) BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD AND TEL AVIV.

NEJ/14

JORDAN INTERNAL.

A GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ISSUED YESTERDAY SAID THAT AT A MEETING OF THE ARAB MILITARY SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE ON 5 DECEMBER, THE FEDAYEEN DELEGATES PRESENTED A NOTE ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT OF VIOLATING THE CAIRO AND AMMAN AGREEMENTS AND THEN WALKED OUT OF THE MEETING. "FATAH" NEWSPAPER OF 6 DECEMBER LISTS THE FEDAYEEN ACCUSATIONS WHICH INCLUDE THE MASSING OF ARMED FORCES IN VARIOUS PARTS OF AMMAN AND OTHER TOWNS AND ON ROADS, CREATING "AN IMAGINARY DANGER" ON THE SYRIAN BORDER WITH THE OBJECT OF ISOLATING THE RESISTANCE, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW CHECK-POINTS, THE CLOSING OF THE SOUTH TO THE RESISTANCE, FIRING BY ARMY OR SECURITY FORCES WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION AND THE GROWING NUMBER OF ARMED PATROLS.

JERASH.

2. THE GOVERNMENT STATEMENT SAYS THAT AT 1600 LOCAL TIME ON 5 DECEMBER THE FEDAYEEN IN AND AROUND JERASH BESIEGED THE PUBLIC SECURITY HQ IN THE TOWN. THE SIEGE WAS ENDED WHEN THE ARAB MILITARY OBSERVERS INTERVENED. THE STATEMENT SAYS THAT THE FEDAYEEN HAD ACCUSED THE ARMY OF PLANNING TO ATTACK THE FEDAYEEN IN JERASH BUT POINTS OUT THAT THE JORDAN ARMY DOES NOT HAVE A SINGLE SOLDIER IN THE TOWN (SEE PARA 5 BELOW). A FURTHER FEDAYEEN ATTACK ON THE PUBLIC SECURITY HQ TOOK PLACE AT 1230 LOCAL ON 6 DECEMBER, "WITH THE SUPPORT OF VARIOUS ARMS, THE EXISTENCE OF WHICH IN JERASH AND OTHER JORDANIAN TOWNS WAS FORBIDDEN UNDER THE CAIRO AND AMMAN AGREEMENTS". THE HQ WAS BROKEN INTO AND LOOTED AND THE POLICEMEN THERE ARRESTED. ONE POLICEMAN WAS KILLED AND A POLICEMAN AND A CIVILIAN WERE INJURED.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 3. A FEDAYEEN



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

3. A FEDAYEEN STATEMENT ON THE INCIDENTS IN JERASH OF 6 DECEMBER ACCUSES A MOBILE ARMY PATROL OF OPENING FIRE ON FEDAYEEN FORMATIONS, SUPPORTED BY OTHER ARMY FORCES USING MACHINE-GUNS, MORTARS AND 106 MMS. FIRING WAS ALSO STARTED IN THE STREETS OF JERASH BY ARMY FORCES "STATIONED AT THE JERASH DIVISIONAL HQ BUILDING".

AMMAN.  
-----

4. THE OFFICIAL ARMY SPOKESMAN STATES THAT ON THE AFTERNOON OF 6 DECEMBER A NUMBER OF FEDAYEEN WERE NOTED GATHERING IN THE AREA OF JEBEL AMMAN AT A POINT SOUTH OF FIRST CIRCLE, RAS-AL-AIN, AND JEBEL AKHDAR. LATER FIRING BROKE OUT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THE FEDAYEEN. HOWEVER, THIS MORNING LIFE IN CENTRAL AMMAN IS NORMAL, AND IT IS A FACT THAT NONE OF THE NIGHT TIME FIRING IN AMMAN DURING THE PAST FORTNIGHT HAS AFFECTED DAYTIME LIFE IN THE CITY.

GENERAL COMMENT.  
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5. THE FEDAYEEN HAVE BEEN ENSCONCED IN JERASH TOWN AND RUINS EVER SINCE THE END OF THE SEPTEMBER FIGHTING, ALTHOUGH THE AGREEMENTS DO NOT ALLOW THEM TO HAVE REGULAR FORCES IN TOWNS. THEY ARE CLEARLY RESISTING CONTINUING GOVERNMENT PRESSURE TO GET THEM OUT. WE DO NOT KNOW OF ANY ARMY/DIVISIONAL HQ IN JERASH (PARA 2 ABOVE) - INDEED IT SEEMS THAT THE FEDAYEEN ARE DELIBERATELY BLURRING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES FOR THEIR OWN ENDS. (IT IS OF COURSE NO LESS POSSIBLE THAT THE ARMY HAVE BEEN DOING LIKEWISE BOTH IN AMMAN AND JERASH).

6 IN GENERAL, CLASHES HAVE OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS BEEN SHARPER AND MORE FREQUENT THAN USUAL, AND ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY THE RESULT OF WASFI TEL'S DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THE RESTORATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY, BY FORCE IF NECESSARY. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS (E.G. CALLS BY FATAH FOR BETTER DISCIPLINE AMONG THE FEDAYEEN)

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/ THAT SOME



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AMMAN TEL NO. 957 TO FCO.

- 3 -

THAT SOME GROUPS OF THE LATTER ARE OUT OF HAND. I THINK THAT WE SHALL FOR A PERIOD CONTINUE TO HAVE INCIDENTS ON A RATHER MORE INTENSE SCALE BOTH IN AMMAN AND UP-COUNTRY BUT I DO NOT DOUBT THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO CONTAIN THEM.

DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE TO MOD DI4 AND JIS(NE)

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO DEFCONCEN

MR PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.].

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PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 081000Z

TO MOD

DECEMBER 1970

457

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081000Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO 081000Z DEC 70 REPEATED FOR PNFO  
TO BEIRUT TEL AVIV CAIRO BAGHDAD FCO HQBFNE JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

SITUATION IN AMMAN AS AT 080800Z DECEMBER.

NET 1/4

1. LAST NIGHT WAS QUIET THOUGH A FEW SHOTS WERE HEARD IN THE  
EARLY HOURS OF THIS MORNING. *P am 9/12*
2. AT 0730Z THIS MORNING SOUNDS OF FIRING WERE HEARD FROM THE  
SUWEILIH DIRECTION. OFFICIAL ARMY SPOKESMAN STATES THAT THIS  
INCIDENT OCCURRED WHEN AN ARMY ROAD PATROL WAS FIRED ON BY FEDAYEEN  
ESTABLISHED IN POSITIONS NEAR BAQAA REFUGEE CAMP. KATYUSHA ROCKETS  
WERE FIRED AT THE ARMY PATROL. THE PATROL DEPLOYED AND RETURNED  
FIRE NO CASUALTIES ARE REPORTED IN THIS ENGAGEMENT WHICH LASTED  
FOR ABOUT 15 MINUTES.
3. ARMY SPOKESMAN HAS NO FURTHER STATEMENT TO ISSUE ABOUT THE  
SITUATION IN JERASH. HE SAID, JUST BEFORE THE SUWEILIH INCIDENT  
OCCURRED THAT THE MAIN ROAD THROUGH JERASH WAS OPEN.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 ROUTINE TO HQBFNE JIS(NE) AND  
JIS GULF

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

/SENT TO D.C.C./

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SIR W. LUCE

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PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 960

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081500Z

ADDRESSED TO FC0 TELEGRAM NO 960 DATED 8 DECEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOD DI4 JIS(NE) BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV JIS GULF HQBFNE.

OUR TEL NO 957 OF 7 DECEMBER

JORDAN INTERNAL.

IN A STATEMENT ISSUED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, THE OFFICIAL JORDAN GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF FEDAYEEN ATTACKS IN JERASH ON 5 AND 6 DECEMBER, 5 POLICEMEN WERE KILLED, 6 WOUNDED AND 40 KIDNAPPED. THE GOVERNMENT SET A DEADLINE OF 10.00 HOURS LOCAL 7 DECEMBER (LATER EXTENDED TO 11.00 HRS) FOR THE FEDAYEEN TO LEAVE JERASH PUBLIC SECURITY HQ AND RETURN THE KIDNAPPED MEN, BUT THE ONLY RESULT WAS FEDAYEEN ATTACKS ON ARMY POSITIONS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AROUND JERASH. AN ARMY FORCE THEN MOVED INTO THE TOWN, RECAPTURED THE PUBLIC SECURITY HQ AND REOPENED THE MAIN ROAD

2. A CENTRAL COMMITTEE STATEMENT ACCUSES THE ARMY OF ATTACKING FEDAYEEN POSITIONS AND FIRING ON TWO REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE JERASH AREA. THE ARAB MILITARY COMMITTEE MET YESTERDAY AND WILL MEET AGAIN TODAY TO DISCUSS THE JERASH SITUATION. A STATEMENT ISSUED LAST NIGHT BY THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR SAYS THAT THE TWO SIDES HAVE AGREED TO END PROVOCATIONS AND THE TENSE SITUATION. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HIGHER ARAB COMMITTEE, BAH I AL-ADGHAM MAY RETURN TO JORDAN SOONER THAN EXPECTED AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING.

3. SEE MIFT

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TO F.C.O.

8 DECEMBER 1970

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NET 1/4

9/12



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- 2 -

3. THE FEDAYEEN TOO HAVE MOTIVES FOR STIRRING THE POT. THE LAST WEEK HAS SEEN KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO CAIRO AND THE ISSUING OF A RELATIVELY FRIENDLY COMMUNIQUE, THE RETURN OF THE UAR AMBASSADOR TO AMMAN AFTER A LENGTHY ABSENCE AND THE RESUMPTION OF KUWAITI AID TO JORDAN. THE FEDAYEEN MAY THEREFORE FEAR THAT THEY ARE IN DANGER OF BECOMING ISOLATED IN THE ARAB WORLD, AND THAT HUSSEIN AND THE EGYPTIANS HAVE DECIDED TO IGNORE THEM IN PURSUING A RESUMPTION OF THE JARRING TALKS. FROM THEIR EXPERIENCE IN SEPTEMBER THEY MAY WELL CALCULATE THAT WHEN THERE IS FIGHTING IN JORDAN, THE OTHER ARAB STATES (AND ESPECIALLY THE UAR) FEEL OBLIGED TO COME OUT ON THE FEDAYEEN SIDE, WHILE WHEN THERE IS QUIET, THEIR TENDENCY IS TO MEND THEIR FENCES WITH KING HUSSEIN. THAT THIS CALCULATION IS CORRECT MAY BE BORNE OUT BY A BBC REPORT THIS MORNING THAT CAIRO HAS ALREADY ISSUED A REQUEST TO KING HUSSEIN TO END THE FIGHTING (A STATEMENT WHICH MUST BE MOST UNWELCOME TO THE KING ON HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON).

4. THE ABOVE ANALYSIS IS LARGELY BORNE OUT BY PRINCE HASSAN, WITH WHOM I DISCUSSED THE SITUATION THIS MORNING WHILE THIS TELEGRAM WAS IN DRAFT. HE ALSO CONFIRMS WHAT WE HAVE SUSPECTED FOR SOME TIME, THAT ARAFAT IS ONLY IN INTERMITTENT CONTROL OF SOME FEDAYEEN GROUPS BOTH IN AMMAN AND UP-COUNTRY. PRINCE HASSAN ADDED THAT ARAFAT AND WASFI TEL HAD A "FAIRLY AMICABLE DISCUSSION" YESTERDAY.

DEFCONCEN PASS TO MOD DI4 JIS(NE) JIS GULF AND HQBFNE

FCO PASS TO DEFCONCEN

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

MR. PHILLIPS

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CYPHER CAT/A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 961

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TO F.C.O. LONDON  
8 DECEMBER 1970

460

CONFIDENTIAL 081400Z.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 961 DATED 8 DECEMBER 1970 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO MOD DI4 JIS(NE) JIS GULF HQBFNE BEIRUT CAIRO  
BAGHDAD TEL AVIV

M I P T

JORDAN INTERNAL.

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9/12

NET 1/4

THE FIGHTING AROUND JERASH HAS CLEARLY BEEN SERIOUS ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO SIFT THE FACTS FROM THE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS OF THE TWO SIDES. BOTH SIDES MAY BE IN BREACH OF THE AGREEMENTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT "FEDAYEEN TERRITORY" AS DEFINED IN THE STILL SECRET SECTION 3 OF THE AMMAN AGREEMENT LIES TO THE WEST OF THE MAIN NORTH-SOUTH ROAD THROUGH JERASH. THUS THE FEDAYEEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE IN THE RUINS OF THE ROMAN CITY (WEST OF THE ROAD) BUT NOT IN THE MODERN TOWN. THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN SEEN IN SOME NUMBERS IN BOTH, AND FOR SOME TIME AFTER THE SEPTEMBER FIGHTING WERE ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH THE EXCUSE THAT JERASH WAS JUST A STAGING AREA FOR FEDAYEEN MOVING OUT OF AMMAN AND INTO BASES IN THE COUNTRY-SIDE.

2. SINCE SEPTEMBER THE ARMY HAS BEEN UNABLE WITH ANY CONFIDENCE TO USE THE MAIN ROAD NORTH FROM AMMAN TO THE FRONTIER FOR FEAR OF FEDAYEEN ATTACKS, AND THE MAIN LINE OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE FORCES IN THE NORTH HAS BEEN VIA THE JORDAN VALLEY. THEY CLEARLY COULD NOT TOLERATE THIS SITUATION, CAUSED BY THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF FEDAYEEN IN THE JERASH AREA. IN ADDITION, IF JERASH IS HELD BY GOVERNMENT FORCES, IT MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE FEDAYEEN TO BE RESUPPLIED BY THE IRAQI'S. (IT IS DOUBTFUL THOUGH WHETHER THE AMMAN AGREEMENT GIVES THE ARMY THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE WITH FEDAYEEN ARMS SUPPLIES).

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/3. THE



RESTRICTED



his whole speech.

4. After Abu Omar, the Black Panthers and the National Union of Iranian students produced their jumbled verbiage, and had to be silenced by the Chairmen. After that the meeting fizzled out. It was all a very damp squib, and I should say that the Imperialist-Fascist-Zionists have little to fear from such a group as this.

(C.W. Long)

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

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Near Eastern Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

*p m*  
*9/12*

(NEJ 1/4)

8 December, 1970

Jordanian Government/Fedayeen Relations

450

Thank you for your letter 1/1 of 26 November on this subject which continues to be of lively interest here.

2. I thought you might be amused to hear (with reference to the enclosure of your letter) of some Palestinian activity in London. On Friday, 27 November, I attended a Palestinian student meeting at Imperial College, addressed by Abu Omar (alias Ibrahim Mikha'il?) of the P.L.O. It was moved to a different venue at the last minute, because of an anonymous telephone call about a bomb: and started forty five minutes late. Those attending were a motley bunch of young revolutionaries of various shapes and sizes and Abu Omar treated us to a disappointingly low-key exposition of the events of September. Israel was mentioned only twice in his whole speech: almost the entire burden of his rather feeble venom fell on King Hussein. But he admitted that the fedayeen themselves had made mistakes:

(i) they had provoked the authorities by their "exhibitionism", especially in Amman;

(ii) they had indulged in "bad behaviour": it was morally impeccable for fedayeen to steal cars (which belonged to the people and had merely been usurped by the capitalists) but a mistake to do so at that time; and

(iii) their propaganda, with such misplaced slogans as "All Power to the Revolution!" had alienated the masses.

3. These three "faults" were also mentioned by Yasser Arafat to the Le Monde correspondent, Eric Rouleau, on 12 November, except that Arafat also called the September hijackings a mistake, while Abu Omar made only one, fleeting, reference to them in

/his whole

C.P. Carter Esq.,  
AMMAN.

c.c. Chanceries at:  
Cairo, Beirut, Tel Aviv.



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CYPHER CAT/A

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO FOH 111015Z

TO MOD DI4

DECEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 111015Z DEC 70 REPEATED FOR INFO  
TO ROUTINE FCO BAGHDAD BEIRUT TEL AVIV CAIRO HQBFNE JISNE AND JIS  
GULF.

SITUATION IN AMMAN AS AT 110900Z DEC.

1. BETWEEN 0200 HOURS AND 0400 HOURS TODAY QUITE HEAVY FIRING  
BROKE OUT AND THE SOUNDS OF SEVERAL ROCKET/GRENADE TYPE OF EXPLOSIONS  
WERE HEARD FROM VARIOUS PARTS OF AMMAN.
2. BEING FRIDAY THE QIADA IS NOT FULLY MANNED AND NO OFFICIAL  
STATEMENT IS AVAILABLE. A SENIOR ARMY OFFICER TOLD THE DA THAT  
THE TROUBLE STARTED WHEN FEDAYEEN FIRED ON SOME SECURITY POLICE  
POSITIONS AND THAT THE TROUBLE WAS NOT SERIOUS.
3. TRAFFIC IS MOVING NORMALLY.

DEFCONCEN PASS TO ROUTINE HQBFNE JISNE JIS GULF AND PRIORITY TO  
MOD DI4

FCO PASS PRIORITY DEFCONCEN

[SENT TO Dec]

MR. PHILLIPS

FILES

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SIR P. ADAMS

SIR W. LUCE

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FFFFF



4. WE HAVE FIRST HAND EVIDENCE THAT THE JERASH TO AJLUN ROAD IS MINED AT THE ENTRANCE AND EXIT TO THE VILLAGE OF SAKIB YA6476, AND THAT THE PLA FEDAYEEN IN THIS AREA ARE SHOWING A DOGGED DETERMINATION. THIS VILLAGE IS NEAR A REFUGEE CAMP.

5. DDMI SAID THAT THE IRAQIS HAD REDUCED THE NUMBER OF ARMoured TROOPS THEY HAD PLACED AT AZRAQ DURING THE SEPTEMBER CRISIS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS WERE STILL CONTINUING TO WITHDRAW TROOPS IN SMALL PACKETS QUOTE A COMPANY AT A TIME UNQUOTE BUT THAT THE ARMoured BRIGADES WOULD REMAIN INCLUDING 8 MECH BDE AT KHAW.

6. AN INCH OF SNOW FELL IN AMMAN YESTERDAY AND IT IS COLD. THE FEDAYEEN IN THE AJLUN HILLS MUST BE MOST UNCOMFORTABLE AND OPERATIONS MAY WELL HAVE TO BE CURTAILED TEMPORARILY.

7. FIRING AT NIGHT IN AMMAN NOW OCCURS REGULARLY. LAST NIGHT THE AIRPORT LIGHTS WERE SWITCHED OFF AS THERE WAS FIRING IN THE VICINITY LIFE BY DAY CONTINUES TO BE NORMAL.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 ROUTINE TO HQBFNE JIS(NEEF AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.].

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463

IPHER CAT/A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 140945Z

TO MOD DI4  
DECEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

140945Z

NEJ 1/4

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO 140945Z DEC 70 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION ROUTINE TO FCO BEIRUT TEL AVIV CAIRO BAGHDAD HQBFNE  
JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

FROM DA AMMAN.

1. WHEN DISCUSSING THE GENERAL SITUATION IN NORTH JORDAN, ON 12  
DECEMBER, D/DMI JORDAN ARMED FORCES SAID THAT THE JERASH CLEARING  
OPERATION WAS ALMOST COMPLETE. IT WAS HOPED THAT THE ARMY WOULD  
WITHDRAW LEAVING ONLY POLICE IN THE TOWN BY EARLY THIS WEEK...  
HE CONFIRMED THAT TANKS HAVE BEEN USED, (I THINK 2 TANK BATTALION OF  
40 ARMoured BRIGADE).

2. DDMI ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE ABOUT 4000 FEDAYEEN IN THE AREA  
WEST OF THE MAIN ROAD NORTH OF THE ZERQA RIVER, AND AROUND AJLUN.  
OF THESE TWENTY PERCENT MAY BE QUOTE FOREIGNERS UNQUOTE, THAT IS  
IRAQIS OR SYRIANS. HE SAID 421 PLA BATTALION WAS OPERATING THERE.

COMMENT.

IF THIS NUMBER IS REALISTIC THE PROBLEM OF BRINGING THE AREA  
UNDER CONTROL DOES NOT SEEM TOO FORMIDABLE.

3. I QUESTIONED HIM ON WHO CONTROLS THE JERASH TO MAFRAQ ROAD  
AND WHETHER IT WAS STILL OPEN FOR THE IRAQIS TO MOVE SUPPLIES  
FORWARD TO THE FEDAYEEN. HE WAS EVASIVE AS TO THE PRESENT SITUATION  
BUT SAID THAT HE HOPED WITHIN ONE MONTH THAT THE ARMY WILL BE  
FIRMELY ESTABLISHED IN THIS AREA.

COMMENT.

IT MAY BE THAT THE ARMY HAS TO MOVE CAREFULLY IN THIS AREA TO  
AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH THE IRAQIS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 4. WE HAVE



3. ALL THIS SOUNDS VERY SENSIBLE, AS MANY OF THE RECENT CLASHES HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY SMALL, UNCONTROLLED (POSSIBLY UNCONTROLABLE) GROUPS WHO, BECAUSE THE MILITIA AND THE POPULAR RESISTANCE WERE ALLOWED TO KEEP THEIR ARMS AT HOME WERE ABLE TO LAY THEIR HANDS ON THEM WHENEVER THEY FANCIED.
4. HOWEVER, WE HAVE LISTENED TO TOO MANY STATEMENTS OF GOOD INTENT IN THE PAST TO FEEL ENTIRELY OPTIMISTIC AS TO HOW CONSCIENTIOUSLY THESE PROVISIONS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED.

DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE TO MOD DIA JIS(NE) JISGULF AND HQBFNE

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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464

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
AMMAN.

11 December 1970

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY NO. 11

NEJ 1/4 14/12

Talk with Dr. Jamal Sha'er

I had an interesting talk last week with my favourite Jordanian debating partner, one Dr. Jamal Sha'er. He is an East Banker and a former Ba'athist; a life-long critic of the monarchy, he has spent several spells in Jordanian prisons for his pains. He has admitted close contacts with Sa'iq, (and, incidentally, the former Syrian Ambassador here). He is a personal friend of Kamal Nasser, the former (Ba'athist) PLO spokesman.

2. Dr. Sha'er was in no doubt that the September crisis had strengthened Fatah at the expense of other groups. He said that the Fatah leadership had recently held secret elections which had confirmed all the present leaders in their positions and from which Arafat had again emerged as undisputed leader. The FFLP had lost ground and were blamed for the Amman disaster. Habbash's prudent absence in North Korea was contrasted with Hawatmeh's presence at Arafat's side throughout the fighting. Dr. Sha'er thought that the PFLP could, in consequence, now be the second most important group after Fatah. Sa'iq had been gravely weakened (presumably by recent events in Syria as well as by the September fighting) and was now virtually ineffective. The ALF and most other groups had virtually ceased to exist. (There have, as you probably know, been reports in the Beirut press that certain of the smaller groups such as the APO have decided to merge with Fatah. There have been no similar reports here but I am pretty certain that it must in effect be happening. Perhaps the reason for not making such mergers formal and public is that it would end the representation of the smaller groups on the PLO Central Committee, and hence reduce the size of the pro-Fatah bloc vote.)

3. Dr. Sha'er said that Jordanian politicians were on the whole a despicable lot, interested only in their own personal advantage. Talhouni, for instance, was at present chiding the fedayeen for giving Wasfi Tell's government an easier time than they had given to that of their dear friend Talhouni!

4. On Wasfi himself, Dr. Sha'er was surprisingly uncritical. This fits in with remarks made last week to a member of the Embassy by the head of the PLO Information Office in Amman. The latter said that Wasfi's frankness was an advantage, and in areas where the interests of the two sides converged (e.g. public security)

R.M. Evans, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.O.O.

/it

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CYPHER CAT/A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 975

RESTRICTED

TO F.C.O.

15 DECEMBER 1970

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY NO. 10

NET 1/4

RESTRICTED.

151520Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 975 DATED 15 DECEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION ROUTINE TO MOD DI4 JIS(NE) JIS GULF HQBFNE BEIRUT CAIRO  
BAGHDAD AND TEL AVIV.

*16/12*

JORDAN INTERNAL.

IN A STATEMENT ISSUED YESTERDAY, THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE SAID  
THAT TWO INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE IN AMMAN ON 13 DECEMBER.  
IN THE FIRST, 'IRRESPONSIBLE ELEMENTS' ATTACKED THE SECURITY OFFICE  
IN THE ASHRAFIYA HOSPITAL AND KILLED FOUR OF THE POLICEMEN IN IT.  
(A DOCTOR WORKING NEAR THE HOSPITAL TELLS US THAT THE BODIES WERE  
DECAPITATED). IN THE SECOND, A DRIVER WAS KILLED IN AN ATTACK ON  
AN ARMY VEHICLE IN JEBEL JOFA. THE STATEMENT ADDS THAT THE P.L.O.  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS CONDEMNED THE TWO INCIDENTS, ARRESTED THOSE  
RESPONSIBLE AND HANDED THEM OVER TO THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES.  
'FATAH' NEWSPAPER THIS MORNING CONDEMNS THE KILLING OF THE FOUR  
POLICEMEN AND CARRIES A STATEMENT BY THE 'COMMAND OF THE REVOLUTION'  
SAYING THAT THE FOUR WILL BE CONSIDERED 'MARTYRS OF THE REVOLUTION'.

2. A SECOND STATEMENT PUT OUT BY THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE SAYS  
THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED TO RE-ORGANISE THE FEDAYEEN MILITIA  
AND GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED POPULAR RESISTANCE. THE MEMBERS OF THE  
TWO BODIES WILL BE DISTRIBUTED 'GEOGRAPHICALLY ON THE BASIS OF  
QUARTERS', THEIR STANDARDS OF DISCIPLINE WILL BE RAISED AND THEIR  
ARMS COLLECTED TOGETHER 'ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLE OF GEOGRAPH-  
ICAL DISTRIBUTION'. THE PLACES WHERE THE MILITIA'S ARMS WILL BE  
STORED WILL ENJOY FULL IMMUNITY, AND THESE DECISIONS WILL APPLY TO  
IRBID, ZERQA AND ALL TOWNS AND VILLAGES (WHICH PRESUMABLY INCLUDES  
AMMAN). IN AMMAN, THE 'MILITARY CHARACTER' OF ALL POLICE POSTS  
WILL BE ELIMINATED, THE SECURITY BRIGADE WILL BE WITHDRAWN TO THE  
POSITIONS IT OCCUPIED BEFORE THE INCIDENTS (IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER  
THIS MEANS THE SEPTEMBER INCIDENTS OR MORE RECENT ONES) AND 'EMERG-  
ENCY MEASURES RELATING TO SEARCHES' WILL BE CANCELLED.  
IN ZERQA, THE ACQUISITION, POSSESSION AND CARRYING OF ARMS WILL  
BE BANNED. ALL CHECK-POINTS WILL BE RECONSIDERED RADICALLY WITHIN  
A WEEK IN THE LIGHT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE DECISIONS.  
THIS LAST PROVISION IS PRESUMABLY INTENDED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF  
CHECK-POINTS.

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/3. ALL



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- 2 -

it was possible to co-operate with him. Indeed, we have noticed that Wasfi's handling of affairs so far, while it has been firm, has not on the whole been hasty or tactless - indeed some might say thoroughly un-Wasfi.

Syria

5. Dr. Sha'er also told me that he had called on President Atassi in Damascus in October and had given him a piece of his mind, contrasting the Syrian Ba'ath's verbal external extremism with their internal preoccupation with raising living standards and developing the Syrian tourist trade. He said Atassi had made it quite clear that he was all for the fedayeen making Amman the "Hanoi of the Middle East", provided that there was no question of the venue moving to Damascus! Dr. Sha'er said he thought Assad's overthrow of Jadid was a good thing, as Assad was "more liberal". He agreed, however, that it was a blow to the fedayeen.

*Yours aye,  
Ben*

(B.L. Strachan)

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Chancery,  
Beirut.  
Cairo.  
Tel Aviv.

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CYPHER CAT/A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 171111Z

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TO MOD UK DI4  
DECEMBER 1970

RECEIVED  
REGISTRY NO. 10  
NET 1/4

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171111Z

ADDRESSED TO MODUK DI4 TELEGRAM NO 171111Z DEC 70 REPEATED FOR INFO  
TO ROUTINE CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV BEIRUT HQBFNE JIS NE AND JISGULF  
AND FCO.

FROM DA AMMAN.

1. FIRING BROKE OUT IN THE HARET AL MASARWEH AREA OF JEBEL AMMAN  
BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND CIRCLE AT 1100 HOURS TODAY.
2. QIADA REPORT ONE SOLDIER WOUNDED AND INCIDENT NOW BEING  
INVESTIGATED BY HIGHER ARAB FOLLOW UP COMMITTEE.  
COMMENT. IT IS LIKELY WE THINK THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN MORE  
CASUALTIES.

DEFCOMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MODUK DI4 ROUTINE TO HQBFNE JISNE AND  
JIS GULF

FCO PASS PRIORITY DEFCOMCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

*P. Am*  
18/12

FILES:

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N.AFR.D.  
ARAB.D.  
DEF.D.  
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468

Mr. Langer 2m  
Mr. M. 24/12  
C. 22/12  
F. 22/12  
PUSD  
Res. 23/12



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
AMMAN.

(10/19)

17 December 1970

Dear Christopher, 23/12

NEJ 1/4

23/12

People's Popular Resistance Movement

448

Thank you for your letter NEJ 1/4 of 25 November. The exact status of the "People's Popular Resistance Movement" (otherwise known as the Home Guard, the Civil Militia or the Popular Army) is not entirely clear to us. References to it have occurred from time to time during the past year, and we suspect that Sherif Nasser was the originator of the movement. (Indeed, there are those who claim that he is still running it.) The movement comprises "Home Guard" groups in villages, especially in North Jordan, organised and armed by the government and placed under the command of trusted ex-officers. The policy of the present administration has been to strengthen the movement (our tel 885 of 9 November).

2. The ostensible purpose of the Popular Resistance is protection against Israeli attack, but there is no doubt that the real purpose is to enable villagers to protect themselves against fedayeen who try to intimidate them when seeking food and shelter, a problem that has naturally become more serious since the full-time fedayeen were moved out of the towns following the September fighting. The villagers of Souf (6 km NW of Jerash), for instance have become particularly notorious by popping off at their local feds, and claim to have killed large numbers of them in September. The fedayeen have recently shown signs of being worried by the Popular Resistance, claiming that it has attacked fedayeen groups in the countryside. Their own militia is only of limited value as a counterweight, as it is strongest in the towns and some refugee camps, but not in the villages. In a large-scale clash, though, it is doubtful whether the Popular Resistance could win without army support, as the regular fedayeen fighters are better armed and probably better trained.

3. The development of the Popular Resistance is regrettable but probably inevitable, for if the government did not sponsor the movement, the villagers would probably form their own "Home Guard" outside government control. It is therefore as much a symptom as a cause of the tension between the two sides. Nonetheless, both seem to recognise the dangers of permitting the development of irregular forces with free access to arms (the Amman protocol permits the fedayeen militia to keep their arms at home, and the Popular Resistance is given the same

C.W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

/privilege

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- 2 -

f-465 privilege), and the agreement announced on 14 December (our tel 975) whereby the discipline and organisation of both the fedayeen militia and the Popular Resistance would be tightened and arms stored in central armouries is a welcome development. As usual in Jordan, we will have to wait and see how easy it will be to prise klashnikovs and M1s from their loving owners, and how difficult it will be for them to retrieve their weapons from the armouries when a clash develops.

Yours sincerely,

—  
C. F. Carter  
(C.F. Carter)

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
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PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 240820Z

TO MOD DI4

DECEMBER 1970



CONFIDENTIAL.

240820Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO 240820Z DEC 70

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FCO BAGHDAD CAIRO TEL AVIV BEIRUT HQBFNE  
JIS NE AND JIS GULF.

*Pan*  
28/12

FROM DA AMMAN.

1. INCIDENT NORTH OF SALT NEAR VILLAGE OF UM JAWZAH YA 5854

2. PAPERS REPORT THAT FIRING BROKE OUT BETWEEN VILLAGERS AND FEDAY-  
EEN ON MORNING 23 DECEMBER WHEN FEDAYEEN TRIED TO STOP A FARMER  
PLOUGHING HIS LAND. ONE FARMER IS REPORTED AS KILLED AND ONE  
SOLDIER ON LEAVE DIED FROM WOUNDS LATER. ONE VILLAGER WOUNDED.

3. DDMI TELLS ME THAT THE ARMY WAS NOT INVOLVED.

DEFCOMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 ROUTINE TO HQBFNE JIS NE AND JIS  
GULF

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCOMCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C. C.]

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PRIORITY AMMAN

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

TELEGRAM NO 260810Z

DECEMBER 1970

470

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260810Z.

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO 260810Z DEC 70 REPEATED FOR INFORM.  
TO FCO BEIRUT BAGHDAD TEL AVIV CAIRO HQBFNE JIS(NE) JIS GULF.

NET 1/4

FROM DA AMMAN.

INCIDENTS ON 25 AND 26 DECEMBER.

1. JORDANIAN ARMY SPOKESMAN STATES THAT AT ABOUT 1530 HOURS ON 25 DECEMBER A HAND GRENADE WAS THROWN FROM A CAR AT THIRD CIRCLE JEBEL AMMAN, NOT FAR FROM THIS EMBASSY. THE HAND GRENADE FAILED TO EXPLODE. POLICE OPENED FIRE AND IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE THROWER WAS LATER ARRESTED AND THAT SEVERAL GRENADES WERE FOUND IN HIS CAR.
2. AT 1615 HOURS ON 25 DECEMBER FEDAYEEN OPENED FIRE WITH MMG'S MORTARS AND KATYUSHA ROCKETS ON JORDANIAN ARMY POSITIONS IN AREA WADI KHAKHA NORTH OF SALT. TWO SOLDIERS WERE KILLED AND TWO SOLDIERS WOUNDED. JORDANIAN ARMY UNITS ENGAGED AND PURSUED THE FEDAYEEN. THIS OPERATION IS CONTINUING TODAY 26 DECEMBER.
3. COMMENT. IT SEEMS AS IF THE ARMY WILL NOW CONDUCT MOPPING UP OPERATIONS IN THE SALT AREA ON THE LINES OF THE RECENT JERASH OPERATION AND THAT MORE CLASHES MAY OCCUR.

DEFCONCEN PASS TO HQBFNE JIS NE JIS GULF AND MOD DI4

FCO PASS TO DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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


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(471)

CYPHER CAT /A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 280850Z

TO MOD DI4  
DECEMBER 1970



CONFIDENTIAL.

280850Z

NET 1/4

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO 280850Z DEC 70 REPEATED FOR INFORM  
TO ROUTINE FCO BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV HQBFNE JIS NE AND JIS  
GULF.

Handwritten signature and date 29/12

FROM DA AMMAN.

1. INCIDENTS REPORTED BY JORDANIAN ARMY OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN FOR  
27 DECEMBER.
2. 0845 HOURS TO 1130 HOURS. FEDAYEEN OPENED FIRE WITH MORTARS  
AND MACHINE GUNS ON VILLAGES OF HARTHA AND RAFID (SQARE YB62)  
NORTH EAST OF IRBID. NO CASUALTIES.
3. 1030 HOURS TO 1120 HOURS. FEDAYEEN OPENED FIRE ON A PUBLIC  
SECURITY PATROL VEHICLE IN THE QASMEH AREA OF AMMAN TO THE SOUTH  
EAST OF WAHDAT CAMP. THE FIRE WAS RETURNED. NO CASUALTIES.
4. THREE MINES EXPLODED UNDER VEHICLES ON A TRACK NEAR TABABOOR  
(NOT MARKED ON MAP) BUT WHICH IS BETWEEN THE NEW ZERKA SUWEILIH  
ROAD AND THE NORTHERN RING ROAD FROM AMMAN TO MARKA. ONE MILITARY  
ONE CIVILIAN AND ONE TRACTOR VEHICLE RECEIVED SLIGHT DAMAGE. THE  
DRIVERS WERE INJURED. MINES ARE THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN IN POSITION FOR  
SOME TIME.
5. 1210 HOURS. A MINE EXPLODED UNDER A PUBLIC SECURITY VEHICLE  
IN THE SAME AREA AS INCIDENT REPORTED IN PARA 3. CASUALTIES REPORTED  
ARE ONE KILLED, THREE WOUNDED, VEHICLE WAS DESTROYED THE MINE IS  
THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN IN POSITION SOME TIME.
6. 1615 HOURS. FEDAYEEN FIRED IN THE AIR FROM THE QASMEH AREA OF  
AMMAN.

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/7. BETWEEN



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-2-

7. BETWEEN 1715 HOURS AND 2100 HOURS: FEDAYEEN FIRED IN THE AIR FROM THE JEBEL HUSSEIN AREA SHORT BURSTS OF MG FIRE AND SINGLE SHOTS INTERMITTENTLY.

8. COMMENT.

THIS MORNING CENTRAL AMMAN IS BUSY AS USUAL WITH BOTH POLICE AND UNIFORMED FEDAYEEN PATROLS MOVING NORMALLY. REPORTS OF MINES BEING USED ARE INTERESTING. IT COULD BE THAT PUBLIC SECURITY AND MILITARY PATROLS ARE NOW MOVING IN AREAS WHERE THEY HAVE NOT DONE SO BEFORE.

DEFCOMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 ROUTINE TO HQBFNE JIS NE AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCOMCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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PRIORITY AMMAN

TO MOD DI4

TELEGRAM NO FOH 291055Z

DECEMBER 1970

472


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291055Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 291055Z DEC 70 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO BEIRUT BAGHDAD CAIRO TEL AVIV HQBFNE JIS NE AND  
JIS GULF.

FROM DA AMMAN.



1. JORDANIAN ARMY OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN REPORTS FOLLOWING INCIDENTS  
ON 28 DECEMBER IN AMMAN AREA.
2. 1915 HOURS. FEDAYEEN OPENED FIRE WITH MG'S FROM JEBEL JUAFA  
TOWARDS JEBEL HUSSEIN. FIRING LASTED ABOUT 10 MINS. PUBLIC SECURITY  
FORCES RETURNED FIRE. NO CASUALTIES REPORTED.
3. 1950 HOURS. FEDAYEEN OPENED FIRE FROM THE HARET EL MASARWEH  
AREA (SOUTH OF FIRST CIRCLE) ON TO JEBEL AKHDAR AND AND RAS AL AIN.  
NO CASUALTIES REPORTED.
4. COMMENT:  
THESE INCIDENTS, THOUGH MINOR BY PAST STANDARDS, ARE NOISY  
AND SERVE TO KEEP PEOPLE JUMPY. THEY DO NOT HOWEVER APPEAR TO EFFECT  
THE PATTERN OF LIFE BY DAY. DISPUTE THEIR FREQUENCY MORE TRAFFIC  
IS NOW MOVING AFTER DARK THAN RECENTLY.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 ROUTINE TO HQBFNE JIS NE AND  
JIS GULF

FCO PASS TO PRIORITY DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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SIR W. LUCE

CONFIDENTIAL



740

(10/2)

UNCLASSIFIED



BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

473

18 December, 1970

20 DEC 1970  
MUA 20/40561

NEJ 1/4

Dear Richard,

I am proposing to send you, probably by the next Confidential bag, a despatch about the September hi-jackings, as seen from Amman. I realise this is rather long after the event, but we have naturally been concentrating these last two months on reconstruction rather than on chronicling the past. At the same time I feel that it would be useful to get the story down, if only for the record, and Christopher Lush has, as one of his last contributions to this post, been nobly devilling away at it.

Yours ever,

J.F.S.

(J.F.S. Phillips)

RMF.

A. and T. Dept.

Mr. Long

30/12

Enter

R.E.

Richard Evans, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

Despatch now

rec'd & entered

NE 1/1 pr am  
7/1


23  
/12.





1. The Central Committee would reorganise the militia, distribute its members geographically on the basis of quarters, raise their level of discipline and collect together their arms according to the principle of geographical distribution.
2. The Government would reorganise the popular resistance, distribute its members geographically on the basis of quarters, raise their level of discipline and collect together their arms according to the principle of geographical distribution.
3. The places, in which the arms of the militia would be collected, would enjoy full immunity. It is noted that these are individual arms.
4. These decisions would apply to Irbid, Zerqa and all towns and villages of the kingdom.
5. The military character of all police posts in the capital would be eliminated.
6. The security brigade would be withdrawn from Amman and returned to the original positions which it occupied before the incidents.
7. All emergency measures relating to searches within the capital would be cancelled.
8. The acquisition, possession and carrying of arms would be completely banned in Zerqa and this ban would apply to the militia and the popular resistance.
9. All check-points would be reconsidered radically within a week as from today in the light of the implementation of these decisions.





(i) Mr Lane  
(ii) enter a c/s Res D 4/1/71  
PUTD 474  
31/12

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

22 December 1970

Dear Christopher,

(LAST PAPER) 1/1

Government - Fedayeen Agreement

NET 1/4 (465)

--- Please refer to para 2 of our telegram No. 975 of 15 December. I enclose a complete text of the agreement mentioned.

2. An article entitled "A calm debate on the provisions of the latest agreement" appeared in "Fatah" newspaper on 20 December. It said that the signing of the agreement had produced a wave of anxiety and people were talking about "withdrawing" the arms of the fedayeen militia. It was therefore necessary to examine each of the clauses of the agreement carefully to see exactly what they meant. This the article proceeded to do, and the result is quite illuminating, as well as being an encouraging indication that the fedayeen are sincerely trying to persuade their supporters of the merits of the agreement. On the first clause, the article emphasises that the militia's weapons will be stowed in armouries in each quarter but will not be withdrawn from that quarter. The third clause will ensure that the armouries will not be subject to surprise attack; any such attack would make the whole agreement null and void and the Revolution would have the right to redistribute the arms to the militia. The second clause means that, if any attacks by Popular Resistance elements upon fedayeen groups take place, it will no longer be possible for the authorities to claim that these are "individual incidents and acts". The "military character of police posts" referred to in clause 5 means the possession by police posts of medium and heavy weapons, such as .5 calibre machine-guns, 106 mms and rockets. Clauses 6, 7 and 9 should lead to an end to "provocations", and the searching and arrest of citizens.

3. The article continues by saying that in addition to the published provisions, "the state will adopt a group of important measures which it does not wish to have published for special reasons". In conclusion, the article warns that the feeling that arms are being "withdrawn" from the militia is dangerous. "The presence of our rifles a matter of metres from our homes is not a withdrawal. Similarly the rest of the provisions of the agreement do not afford anyone an opportunity to carry out a surprise attack on our arms."

Yours ever,

*C.F. Carter*  
(C.F. Carter)

C.W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

(LAST PAPER)

Copy to:

Chancery,  
Beirut.



USEFUL INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTENTS OF THIS FILE

TRANSFERS.

Folio 423 — NET 19/8

" 452 + 3 — NET 1/9

" 467 — NE ? (M.E. GEN)

LAST FILE: PART 'R'

NEXT FILE: NET 1/2 (1971)

OTHER RELATED FILES: